Keywords:
cogency, epistemic justification, Gricean procedure, Jackson, Moore's proof, petitio, Pryor, system of beliefs, to argueCopyright (c) 2024 Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación
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Abstract
We explore the features that determine whether or not a certain reasoning is a good reasoning. The good reasonings (in the relevant sense) are the cogent reasonings, according to a very broad interpretation of this concept. The appropriate analysis requires identifying a certain goal or purpose of reasoning: to rationally foster in the addressee the belief in the conclusion. It is also required that the procedure be rational, in accordance with criteria close to the idea of Gricean procedure. According to our definition, whether a reasoning is cogent is an extrinsic feature of the reasoning, relative to the system of beliefs of the addressee. But the implicated relativism is not implausible. Furthermore, this approach allows to characterize a certain absolute, not relative, notion of cogent reasoning; such a characterization would invoke the epistemic quality of the system of beliefs of the addressee. The debate is illustrated by examining Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world.
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