Argumentation and Testimony

Abstract

This paper starts with some questions: 1) is the testimonial argumentation an epistemic argumentation? 2) and then, if so, what epistemic argument are we talking about? 3) and, again, is it reductionist or is it nonreductionist? I try to give some answers to these questions, starting with a philosophical analysis of testimonial argumentation and then trying to draw some philosophica consequences. I show that there are at least two master ways about testimonial argumentation: a reductionist, Hume’s way, and a antireductionist, Campbell’s way and that these impose distinct epistemic demands. My proposal is motivated against the second which is shown to be ultimately unsuccessful in criminal trial. In a process like ours, which requires the Judge to pronounce conviction if and only if the guilt “is” beyond any reasonable doubt, Hume's testimonial argumentation appears to act as method of operation offering more guarantees than the version of Campbell.

Keywords: Anti-reductionist, argumentation, reductionist, testimony.