Keywords:
disagreements, dialogue, verbal disputes, naturalism, metalinguistic negotiations.Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Abstract
Since it is generally accepted in argumentation theory that disputes can be resolved argumentatively, disagreements are expected to find an argumentative resolution, usually on the basis of shared background beliefs. The problem is how to resolve them when they involve propositions constitutive of different theoretical or conceptual frameworks that make rational convergence difficult and sometimes impossible. From a case such as that of ‘philosophical naturalism’, it is argued that there are discussions that are presented as metalinguistic negotiations but involve deep disagreements that need not be rationally irresolvable disagreements and may even be beneficial. Philosophers in a dispute can improve their theories even as they disagree, without necessarily hindering dialogue. These cases could be considered as virtuous deep disagreements
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