Keywords:
argumentative force, counterpart, critical questions, defeasible argumentation, rebuttal, sufficiency, undercutterCopyright (c) 2023 Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a definition for the concept of sufficiency that duly takes into account the defeasible nature of the vast majority of the arguments we use in our everyday discussions, and that can be used as a tool for the evaluation of this type of arguments in practice. To this end, the paper reviews definitions proposed by various theories of argumentation of logical, rhetorical and dialectical orientation, and provides a definition which integrates elements from these different approaches into a coherent whole. The definition is then complemented by specifying the meaning of its key terms, with a view to answering three questions which have been at center of the debate on argumentative sufficiency: (i) what kind of criticisms can the counterpart formulate to the inference of a defeasible argument, ii) who should count as the counterpart of an argument in a given context of discussion, and (iii) what does it mean to respond successfully to these criticisms.
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