Keywords:
argumentation, Informal Logic, Philosophy of Logic, normativity, logic and reasoningCopyright (c) 2024 Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación
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Abstract
In this paper, I defend that logic has a normative status for reasoning. To support my argument, I question whether logic can be limited to a formal calculus that establishes relations among truth-bearers (Goldstein, 1988). Instead, I argue that logic encompasses the study of inference in ordinary language. Similarly, I challenge traditional views of reasoning that depict it as a private process of drawing inferences. Instead, I embrace perspectives that view reasoning as a social activity (Dutilh-Novaes, 2021; Godden, 2015; Kalis, 2022; Mackenzie, 1989). From these bases, I explore the concept of the natural normativity of argumentation (Gilbert, 2007; Jackson, 2019). Since argumentative practices inherently possess a normative dimension, logic aims to capture and represent the rules that govern these linguistic exchanges. Logical rules are the tools from which agents can exert normative control over argumentative practices.
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