No. 53 (2023): Open issue
Articles

United States pressures on technological cooperation with China: the case of the Argentine nuclear sector

Daniel Blinder
CONICET
Published June 28, 2023

Keywords:

International pressures, science and technology cooperation, nuclear technology, Argentina, USA, China
How to Cite
Blinder, D., & Vila Seoane, M. (2023). United States pressures on technological cooperation with China: the case of the Argentine nuclear sector. Relaciones Internacionales, (53), 91–110. https://doi.org/10.15366/relacionesinternacionales2023.53.005

Abstract

In the context of a changing international environment, where geopolitical disputes between great powers have intensified, the International Relations literature has paid increasing attention to the role of science and technology. Most of this literature examines the capabilities of great powers in their race to dominate strategic and/or emerging technologies, with special emphasis on the rivalry between China and the US. However, this literature has paid less attention to how this new competition for technological supremacy affects the acquisition of technological capabilities and/or technology development strategies of Global South states.

The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize the international pressure exerted by one state on another state to prevent it from obtaining and developing technological capabilities transferred by another state, whether it is a rival or not of the former. It is argued that international pressures are a process over time, which are exercised in at least five ways: coercive framing, deception, diplomatic harassment, mediated public diplomacy, and sanctions. Although several of the aforementioned means to exert pressure may also be conducted against different types of projects, we think these are more frequent in science and technology cooperation projects, where coercion in the military sense is not, for the time being, the most usual practice against them.

To illustrate this conceptual approach, this paper analyzes the case of US pressures on Argentina to prevent nuclear cooperation projects with China. This case is relevant to the extent that Argentina is a Southern Cone country, a region historically influenced by the US, but which has recently developed closer scientific and technological cooperation ties with China. Also, Argentina has certain levels of industrialization and scientific and technological capabilities in several sectors in dispute between the US and China.

The case study is based on the analysis of qualitative information gathered on the one hand from official documents,Argentine media outlets articles and other relevant secondary sources. On the other hand, the analysis is based on the collection of original primary sources obtained via in-person semi-structured interviews with Argentine public officials and nuclear companies’ managers involved in cooperation projects with China in the nuclear energy sector. These sources were analyzed to identify the types of pressures exerted by US public officials against the cooperation with China, and to trace their potential effects from the viewpoint of the involved Argentine stakeholders.

The results are presented in three sections. The first one synthesizes the main features of the nuclear programs in Argentina and China, narrating the start of their nuclear cooperation projects. Since 2012, Argentina and China signed a series of nuclear cooperation treaties, which in November 2015 culminated in the signing of agreements for the construction of the fourth and fifth nuclear power plants in the country. The fourth power plant was to follow the Canadian CANDU-type nuclear reactor design, a technology that Argentina masters, and which operates with heavy water and natural uranium. On the other hand, the fifth plant would be built following the indigenous Chinese ACP-1000 design, later rebranded Hualong One or HPR1000, which would operate with enriched uranium and light water.

The second section examines how these projects unfolded during the Macri administration (2015-2019). During this period, the evidence collected indicates the start of the US pressure against the nuclear power plant projects between Argentina and China. This was made particularly through diplomatic harassment, where a misleading frame was communicated to Argentine government officials. Nonetheless, according to the sources we consulted, the pressure was not of high intensity. During the Macri administration, Argentine public officials decided to cancel one of the nuclear plant projects, the CANDU nuclear power plant. Argentine policy makers made this decision not due to US pressures, but because of the scarcity of resources for the project in the context of the country's financial crisis, as well as by their opposition to this type of technology. Meanwhile, they decided to continue with the Hualong One nuclear power plant project.

The third section analyzes the Fernández administration (2019-2022), a period during which the US intensified the pressure against the remaining nuclear power plant project between Argentina and China. The section cites the testimonies of government officials and managers of the Argentine nuclear company that suffered this pressure, and exemplifies how the US complemented diplomatic harassment with the use of a deceptive framing and mediated public diplomacy as pressure tools. The government sources that we consulted explained that these pressures caused the delay of the nuclear plant project with China, because part of the ruling coalition sided with the US position, and prevented the advancement of the financial part of the agreement.

The analysis of this case illustrates the proposed conceptualization of international pressures. The collected data especially records that US pressures against nuclear cooperation projects between Argentina and China were carried out through diplomatic harassment, deceptive framing, and mediated public diplomacy. These pressures have been aimed at ending cooperation on issues that are of interest to the US. However, if the end goal of US diplomacy was to bring about the cancellation of the nuclear power plant project between Argentina and China, the pressure appears to have been unsuccessful. Instead, if we assume that they sought to delay the construction of the nuclear power plant, in this case, since the project has not yet started after its initial announcement of 2015, it can be concluded that US pressure was a relevant factor in such an outcome.

In sum, the contribution of this article serves as an input for academics and public policy makers in analyzing and/or implementing science and technology projects in a context of intensified US-China rivalry. Indeed, the results of this article suggest that Global South states must take into account the potential international pressures against its science and technology cooperation projects with foreign partners, especially when they are relevant to the agenda of great powers involved in rivalry. Although the case analyzed has focused on the nuclear sector, we think that the proposed conceptualization of international pressures developed in this article can be applied to examine numerous others where such practices have been taking place, such as the space sector, 5G and telecommunications, the military sector, biotechnology, among others. Future research could extend the study of international pressures on scientific and technological cooperation projects between great powers and states of the Global South by comparing how they were exerted in different sectors, and with what outcomes.

 

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Adler, E. (1987). The Power of Ideology. The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil. University of California Press.

Argentina (01.02.2022). Se firmó el contrato para la construcción de la Central Nuclear Atucha III. Argentina.gob.ar.

Blinder, D. (2022). El proyecto del misil Cóndor II y la política espacial argentina. UNPAZ Edita.

Blinder D. (2017). Orden Mundial y tecnología. Análisis institucional desde la perspectiva geopolítica en la semiperiferia: la tecnología espacial y de misiles en Argentina y Brasil. Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder, 8 (2), 177-202. https://doi.org/10.5209/GEOP.53257

Blinder, D. y Hurtado, D. (2019). Elementos históricos para entender la geopolítica de la tecnología nuclear en Argentina, en la década de 1980. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, 14 (2), 201-222. https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.3761

Blinder, D. y Vila Seoane, M. (14.10.2022a). Entrevista a Julián Gadano.

Blinder, D. y Vila Seoane, M. (05.08.2022b). Entrevista a Isidro Baschar.

Blinder, D. y Vila Seoane, M. (25.07.2022c). Entrevista a SAE anónimo.

Blinder, D. y Vila Seoane, M. (13.07.2022d). Entrevista a Diego Hurtado.

Bowen, W. (2000). The politics of ballistic missile nonproliferation. Macmillan Press.

Busso, A. (1999). Las relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa. El caso Cóndor II. Centro de Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales de Rosario.

Cabral, F. (15.11.2015). Argentina y China firmaron acuerdos para la construcción de dos nuevas centrales nucleares. Telam.com.ar.

Carson, T. (2010). Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press.

Carus, W. (1990). Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. The Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Cayón, D. (16.05.2022). El kirchnerismo redobla la presión sobre los funcionarios cercanos a Alberto Fernández: ahora pide que Beliz vaya al Senado a explicar por qué no avanza Atucha III. Infobae.com.ar.

Consejo de Estado (2007). Plan de Mediano a Largo Plazo para el desarrollo de la Energía Nuclear (2005-2020). Recuperado de: https://www.gov.cn/gzdt/att/att/site1/20071104/00123f3c4787089759a901.pdf

Consejo de Estado (2006). 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) for National Economic and Social Development. Recuperado de: https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/11th%20Five-Year%20Plan%20%282006-2010%29%20for%20National%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Development%20%28EN%29.pdf

Dandan, A. (22.05.2022). El lobby estadounidense para bloquear la producción de energía nuclear argentina. Página/12.com.ar

Dar, H. (2015). Franco-Pakistan Nuclear Deal (1976): An Analytical Study. Journal of Pakistan Vision, 17 (1), 215-257.

Diamante, S. (11.14.2022). Estados Unidos advierte sobre “la calidad y la seguridad” de China para construir la cuarta central nuclear en la Argentina. Lanacion.com.ar.

Dinatale, M. (19.06.2019). Mauricio Macri cerrará con Xi Jinping un crédito de USD 7.900 millones para construir en Argentina una central nuclear con tecnología china. Infobae.com.ar.

Dinatale, M. (11.11.2018a). Peligra el acuerdo nuclear de Argentina con China por una fuerte pelea interna en el Gobierno. Infobae.com.ar.

Dinatale, M. (18.05.2018b). El Gobierno suspendió un acuerdo nuclear con China para ahorrar USD 9.000 millones. Infobae.com.ar.

Doyle, T. (2013). Liberal democracy and nuclear despotism: two ethical foreign policy dilemmas. Ethics & Global Politics, 6 (3), 155-174.

Entman, R. (2008). Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13 (2), 87-102.

Environment Agency y Office for Nuclear Regulation (07.02.2022). Regulators finish design assessment of new nuclear power station. Gov.uk.

Escudé, C. (1986). La Argentina vs. las grandes potencias. El precio del desafío. Editorial de Belgrano.

Escudé, C. (1995). El realismo de los Estados débiles. La política exterior del primer gobierno de Menem frente a las teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales. GEL.

Freedman, L. (2013). Strategy: a history. Oxford University Press.

Gray, C. (2012). Geopolitics and deterrence. Comparative Strategy, 31 (4), 295-321.

Gray, C. (2000a). Deterrence in the 21st century. Comparative Strategy, 19 (3), 255-261.

Gray, C. (2000b). Deterrence and the nature of strategy. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11 (2), 17-26.

Gobierno de Estados Unidos (07.06.2021). “Executive Order 14032, Addressing the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the People's Republic of China”. Recuperado de: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/14032.pdf

Hurtado, D. (2015). Semiperiphery and Capital-intensive Advanced Technologies: The Construction of Argentina as a Nuclear Proliferation Country. Journal of Science Communication, 14 (2), 1-18.

Hurtado, D. (2014). El sueño de la Argentina Atómica. Edhasa.

Huth, P.K. (1997). Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment. Security Studies, 7 (1), 72-99.

Ikenberry, J. (2014). The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order. Foreign Affairs, 93 (3), 80-90.

Infobae (08.02.2022a). Un congresista de Estados Unidos afirmó que “Argentina se unió al Partido Comunista chino”. Infobae.com.ar.

Infobae (03.02.2022b). Un senador republicano cuestionó la construcción de una central nuclear china: “Argentina debería dar marcha atrás”. Infobae.com.ar.

Jervis, R. (1979). Deterrence Theory Revisited. World Politics, 31 (2), 289-324.

Jordán, J. (2022). La disuasión en la zona gris: una exploración teórica. Revista Española De Ciencia Política, (59), 65-88.

Keohane, R. y Nye, J. (2011). Power and Interdependence. Longman.

Kerr, P. (2010). Diplomatic Persuasion: An Under-Investigated Process. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 5 (3), 235-261.

Kissigner, H. (1957). Nuclear Power and Foreign Policy. Harper Brothers.

Knopf, J. (2010). The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research. Contemporary Security Policy, 31 (1), 1-33.

Krebs, R.R. y Jackson, P.T. (2007). Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations, 13 (1), 35-66.

La Nación (30.11.2018). G20: Trump incomoda a Macri con una declaración provocadora sobre China. Lanacion.com.ar

Lanoszka, A. (2018). Atomic Assurance. The alliance politics of nuclear proliferation. Cornell University Press.

Lieber, K. y Press, D. (2017). The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence. International Security, 41 (4), 9-49.

Malacalza, B. (2020). Cooperación China-Argentina en la Cuarta Revolución Industrial: procesos, nudos críticos y horizontes. Trabajo presentado en el IV Seminario Académico del Observatorio América Latina-Asia Pacífico, Observatorio América Latina-Asia Pacífico de la ALADI, CAF y CEPAL, 67-93.

MccGwire, M. (2006). Nuclear deterrence. International Affairs, 82 (4), 771-784.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (2013). Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics. Oxford University Press.

Morgan, P. (2012). The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today. Contemporary Security Policy, 33 (1), 85-107.

Nye, J. (2011). The future of power. Public Affairs.

Nye, J. (1987). Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes. International Organization, 41 (3), 371-402.

Paarlberg, R. (2004). Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security. International Security, 29 (1), 122-151.

Patti, C. (2021). Brazil in the Global Nuclear Order, 1945–2018. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Patti, C. y Spektor, M. (2020). “We Are Not a Nonproliferation Agency”: Henry Kissinger's Failed Attempt to Accommodate Nuclear Brazil, 1974–1977. Journal of Cold War Studies, 22 (2), 58-93.

Peksen, D. (2019). When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature. Defence and Peace Economics, 30 (6), 635-647.

Pirró e Longo, W. (2007). Tecnologia militar: conceituação, importancia e cerceamento. Tensões Mundiais, 3 (5), 111-143.

Powell, R. (2003). Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense. International Security, 27 (4), 86-118.

Powell, R. (1989). Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation. American Political Science Review, 83 (2), 503-519.

Power Reactor Information System, OIEA. Recuperado de: https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx (18.10.2022).

Ritchie, N. (2019). A hegemonic nuclear order: Understanding the Ban Treaty and the power politics of nuclear weapons. Contemporary Security Policy, 1-26.

Robinson, P., Miller, D., Herring, E. y Bakir, V. (2018). Lying and Deception in Politics. En Jörg Meibauer (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Lying (pp. 529-540). Oxford Handbooks.

Rocca, G. (21.10.2022). «Alta presión»: la visión de Adriana Serquis sobre la postura de EE.UU. en las negociaciones con China. AgendarWeb.com.ar.

Sábato, J. y Ramesh, J. (1980). Programas de energía nuclear en el mundo en desarrollo: su fundamento e impacto. Estudios Internacionales, 13 (49), 70-85.

Saguier, M. y Vila Seoane, M.F. (2022). Argentina and the spatial politics of extractive infrastructures under US-China tensions. En Schindler, S. y DiCarlo, J. (Comps.). The rise of the infrastructure state: How US-China Rivalry shapes politics and place worldwide (pp. 153-166). Bristol University Press.

Sarkar, J. (2019). U.S. Policy to Curb West European Nuclear Exports, 1974-1978. Journal of Cold War Studies, 21 (2), 110-149.

Scibona, N. (05.02.2022). La pesada deuda con China para construir Atucha III”. Lanacion.com.ar.

Thomas, S. (2017). China's nuclear export drive: Trojan Horse or Marshall Plan? Energy Policy, 101, 683-691.

Wirtz, J. (2018). How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence? Strategic Studies Quarterly, 12 (4), 58-75.

Xu, Y. (2010). The politics of nuclear energy in China. Palgrave Macmillan.

Zarate, J. (2013). Treasury's war: the unleashing of a new era of financial warfare. PublicAffairs.