No. 48 (2021): Open Issue
Articles

New Chinese political actors in the South China Sea Conflict: a theoretical challenge to the concept of the state as a unitary actor

Antonio José Pagán Sánchez
City University of Hong Kong - Nankai University
Bio
Portada número 48
Published October 26, 2021

Keywords:

South China Sea, new political acotrs, territorial disputes, realism, unitary state
How to Cite
Pagán Sánchez, A. J. (2021). New Chinese political actors in the South China Sea Conflict: a theoretical challenge to the concept of the state as a unitary actor. Relaciones Internacionales, (48), 213–230. https://doi.org/10.15366/relacionesinternacionales2021.48.011

Abstract

For almost half a century, conflict in the South China Sea has constituted a challenge to China's diplomatic relations with the countries in the region. The dispute over the more than 200 islands, reefs and rocks located mainly around the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos has repeatedly unleashed military clashes between the different states involved, as well as popular demonstrations in support of their respective countries.

Since the People´s Republic of China is a one-party socialist regime, it might be expected that its response to the conflict would be unitary and homogeneous, suiting the concept of the state as a unitary actor. According to this concept, states would behave at the international level as unitary and rational entities whose behavior is determined by the structure of the international system and not by their internal composition. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the extent to which this concept applies to China's behavior in the South China Sea dispute.

As a frequent source of tension in the region, the South China Sea conflict has received widespread attention during the last decades. Already in the 1970s and 1980s, the first studies began to emerge focusing on Chinese responses to the territorial disputes, although limiting their scope to the analysis of the possibility of China resorting to force to impose its claims. It is necessary to go back to the 1990s to find the only work (Wu and Bueno de Mesquita, 1994) that, focusing exclusively on the South China Sea conflict, analyzes the differentiated impact of different Chinese political actors. Unfortunately, this work has become obsolete, as in recent years there has been a growing fragmentation in the number of actors with the ability to influence China's foreign policy. Academic publications so far have focused either exclusively on the South China Sea conflict, but without addressing it from the point of view of the impact that various Chinese actors might have on the Chinese response, or in the analysis of these actors, but without focusing exclusively on the dispute this paper is dealing with. The present paper aims to fill this research gap, carrying out a study of the impact of the growing number of Chinese political actors on the behavior of their country in the conflict, and it will do so by testing the theoretical applicability of a concept so widespread in the field of International Relations: the state as a unitary actor.

The approach of this paper is based on two premises. First, because China would seem, a priori, a favorable case for the study of the viability of the concept of the state as a unitary actor, given the nature of its political regime. Second, because the South China Sea dispute is a timely issue on which a solution is not expected in the short or medium term, and therefore the approach of this paper might enhance the understanding of China's future actions in the conflict.

To this end, this paper will analyze the participation in the conflict of the leadership structures of the Chinese Communist Party, the State, the People´'s Liberation Army, provincial and local governments, commercial companies, and public opinion. These actors are aware that China will not abandon its territorial claims in the area, so they try to exert influence to further their own interests and points of view. The paper concludes that these actors are not only capable of influencing the considerations and decisions of the Chinese leadership, but also that, with their -on occasions contradictory- actions, they make it no longer possible to argue that China's behavior fits the concept of the state as a unitary actor supported by realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau or John Mearsheimer.

Undoubtedly, the Politburo Standing Committee and, especially, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (Xi Jinping), play the most crucial role when it comes to China's behavior in the South China Sea conflict. In fact, the General Secretary´'s more assertive views have largely determined China's actions over the past decade. However, it is still necessary to maintain a consensual decision-making process. This consensus, combined with the participation of foreign policy advisers, can lead to relatively slow decision-making. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally adopted a more prudent and conciliatory stance, having clashes with other state agencies that, with their more assertive attitude, might act to the detriment of Chinese foreign policy. For its part, the People's Liberation Army has a limited influence through official channels. However, it can reach public opinion through nationalist messages in social media, and its operational autonomy gives it a margin of maneuver to carry out military actions that, although not being decided by the Chinese leaders, could increase China´'s political tensions with its neighbors. Provincial and local governments, as well as commercial companies, are favored by the ambiguous guidelines emanating from the central political power, enhancing their divergent behaviors based on their own interests: while some governments and companies are favored by the exaltation of the defense of China's territorial claims on the islands, others maintain a more conciliatory stance, stressing the positive results provided by the cooperation with neighboring countries. Finally, public opinion vehemently defends China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, a double-edged sword for the government, which may find its room for maneuver limited under future situations of crisis. In fact, citizen pressures could be behind the more assertive attitude shown by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in recent times.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section will introduce the theoretical framework of the paper, explaining the realist conception of the state as a unitary actor. At the same time it will put into context the evolution of China's foreign policymaking over the past decades, a process that has become increasingly complex, while also presenting a brief literature review on the South China Sea conflict. The second section will analyze the impact of the Chinese political actors mentioned above on the conflict. Finally, the conclusion section will present the main results obtained by the paper and suggest new avenues for future studies.

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