Political Decision, not a technical issue: dual use and nuclear proliferation in the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil
Keywords:
Argentina, Brazil, Nuclear Cooperation, Nuclear non-proliferation, Dual useCopyright (c) 2024 Luiza Elena Januário
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Abstract
The advent of the atomic bomb significantly impacted international politics and national strategies in the second half of the 20th century. The transformation represented by nuclear weapons in terms of speed of action and destructive capability raised fears about the consequences of their proliferation. At the same time, the possibilities of peaceful use of nuclear energy emerged, which would be associated with ideas of modernization and development in various parts of the world. Thus, the dilemma of dual use of nuclear technology was outlined. On the one hand, the proliferation of technology for military purposes posed a threat to international peace and security. On the other hand, technological development for peaceful applications constituted a right of sovereign states, representing opportunities for scientific advancement.
An important issue for the non-proliferation regime is the dual nature of nuclear technology, meaning its potential for peaceful and non-peaceful purposes. However, the way this topic is typically addressed has been a source of discomfort for Argentina and Brazil in the second half of the 20th century, as there is a tendency to reduce proliferation to a technical problem automatically derived from technological development, disregarding the fundamental role of political decision-making in whether a country develops nuclear weapons or not. This emphasis was reflected in restrictions on access to sensitive technology and pressures towards adherence to the regime.
Argentina and Brazil established themselves as the countries with the most advanced nuclear programs in South America in the second half of the 20th century, and the pendulum-like logic of rivalry and cooperation which characterized their bilateral relationship was also reflected in their nuclear relations. The presence of competition and mistrust, coupled with the critical stance these countries held toward the nuclear non-proliferation regime, raised international concerns about the risk of proliferation and the initiation of a nuclear arms race in the region. However, Argentina and Brazil engaged in a process of confidence building, building trust and closer ties during the 1980s. This resulted in an original initiative regarding nuclear safeguards and new engagement standards with the non-proliferation regime in the early 1990s.
A fundamental aspect of this process lies in the convergence of views between the two countries regarding the challenges posed by the non-proliferation regime, especially through its primary instrument: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Indeed, both South American countries shared the understanding that the non-proliferation regime was not only discriminatory but also fundamentally unjust, placing the burden of international security and stability on non-nuclear-armed states. On the other hand, nuclear-armed states maintained their prerogatives and, in the name of security, constrained the technological development pursuits of other countries in initiatives that ensured the protection of their own interests- whether related to maintaining the status quo or safeguarding commercial oligopolies.
One of the issues at hand concerns the implications of the dual use of technology, particularly regarding the tendency to reduce nuclear proliferation to a technical problem automatically derived from technological development. This present work is guided by questions about the impact of conceptualizing nuclear proliferation as a political issue on the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil in the second half of the 1980s.
Using a critical perspective towards the global nuclear order, the aim is to analyze how this issue became a significant point for bilateral cooperation in the field, and to explore the implications of framing proliferation as a political matter for the two countries’ understanding of the non-proliferation regime and the nuclear order. The methodological approach is based on collecting and analyzing primary and secondary sources. In addition to the literature review, documents from both countries, obtained from the Historical Archive of Itamaraty (Brasília, Brazil) and the Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Buenos Aires, Argentina), are used.
The reduction of proliferation to a technical aspect posed a fundamental problem for Argentina and Brazil's conceptions of the nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and it served as a point of convergence for their bilateral approach. It stimulated the perception that there was a need to coordinate positions on nuclear policy issues. The criticism of the two South American countries directed at the non-proliferation regime, with its perceived discriminatory and unjust character, is well-recognized. Examining in greater detail how this assessment was constructed in speeches and official documents makes it possible to explore constituent elements that reveal challenges for ongoing international initiatives. These challenges persist to this day.
In this regard, framing proliferation as a technical problem reveals a mechanism supporting the global nuclear order, stimulating and justifying pressures and constraints on developing nuclear programs. If proliferation is seen as urgent and determinant and is linked to mere technical capability, then efforts must be made to restrict the possibility of its occurrence, including through constraints on technological advancement. This logic inherently defends the commercial and geopolitical interests of a small group of countries, perpetuating the status quo through an approach that assumes some countries are trustworthy and responsible enough to possess scientific and technological knowledge while others are not.
The perception of hypocrisy, inequality, and hindrance to development was associated with this view, underpinning Argentina’s and Brazil’s perspectives on the non-proliferation regime. This perspective encouraged their rapprochement, as framing the dual-use issue in nuclear technology was seen as a mechanism that served the interests of central powers, not primarily in promoting peace and international stability.
Furthermore, reducing proliferation to a technical problem is associated with broader mechanisms for maintaining the prevailing order, which has implications for today’s global nuclear order. This approach, particularly in stifling possible alternatives through a discourse of the rationality of existing structures, reinforces an image of a rational and adequately functioning order while concealing the role of power dynamics and political decision-making in proliferation. It thereby masks how initiatives favor certain actors.
This perspective appears to deepen and underscores the exclusion, at least partially, of the interests of some countries in existing initiatives. It is closely linked to the issue of fairness within the non-proliferation regime and the challenges and criticisms related to the global nuclear order.
In addition to the introduction and the concluding remarks, this article is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the dual use of technology and its relationship with the current configuration of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the global nuclear order. Following that, the article explores the positions of Argentina and Brazil regarding the NPT, highlighting the terms in which the debate was framed in both countries. Finally, the article discusses elements that facilitated the bilateral rapprochement based on a shared interpretation of the non-proliferation regime and analyzes the proliferation issue as a political problem.
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