No. 55 (2024): The changes in the liberal peace at the beginning of the 21st century
Articles

The chinese perspective on the international liberal order: a new world order?

Cristina Melero Escamilla
Universidad Loyola Andalucía (España)
Bio
Published February 28, 2024

Keywords:

liberal international order, china, russia, reform of the international system, balance of power, powershaping dynamics
How to Cite
Melero Escamilla, C. (2024). The chinese perspective on the international liberal order: a new world order?. Relaciones Internacionales, (55), 93–110. https://doi.org/10.15366/relacionesinternacionales2024.55.005

Abstract

The global landscape is experiencing a dramatic shift, largely shaped by China's ascent as a major economic and political force. The aim of this research is to analyze China's stance on the international liberal order, to scrutinize whether China is currently proposing an alternative model of a world order and to scan how it differs from the current order. It relies on a foundation of multidimensional theoretical and methodological approach, delving into academic literature on the crisis of the liberal order and China's stance. This study incorporates pertinent economic, demographic, and political data to help the comprehension of a spectrum of perspectives, which involves referring to books, academic articles, and reports from international organizations to establish a solid historical and conceptual framework concerning the decline of the international liberal order and China's current aspirations regarding the world order. The theoretical framework of this study encompasses liberal theory, the root of International Liberalism, intertwined with realist and constructivist theories of International Relations. It also considers hegemony theory's principles and their correlation with the evolution of international orders, as well as global governance theory and its interplay with present and future challenges. This endeavor seeks to offer a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics and shifts in the international order which is long led by Western nations and championing democracy, human rights, and free trade and is now undergoing a significant crisis. This crisis can be scrutinized: Firstly, a legitimacy crisis has arisen due to growing inequality, lack of representation, and widespread corruption, eroding trust in institutions. Secondly, a rise in populism and nationalism has shifted focus towards protectionist policies, challenging international cooperation. Lastly, the rise of China as a major player has led to tensions, revealing the flaws and limitations of the current liberal international order. These crises can be partly explained by significant challenges to the liberal order since 2016, marked by major social and political shifts such as Trump's presidency, Brexit, migration crises, US-China trade tensions, and the impact of covid-19 on the production model, among others. China's rise has sparked fundamental questions about the future trajectory of the global system. Historically, China has prioritized sovereignty and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, a stance rooted in their past experiences with colonization and resistance to foreign intervention. Economic growth and international trade are vital aspects of China's international strategies, which have seen remarkable economic development since Deng Xiaoping's era of reforms in 1978, which lead to China becoming a major player in global trade after joining the WTO in 2001. Since Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2008, China's participation in international institutions has played a more proactive role in maintaining global public goods, albeit with a focus on its own economic and development interests. This also has been possible by developing a more assertive foreign policy, often referred to as "wolf warrior diplomacy," characterized by a stronger defense of Chinese interests and an increase in military capabilities. The recent conflict in Ukraine has shed light on China's stance toward the international liberal order. China's neutral, pro-Russian position in the conflict, avoiding strong condemnation of the invasion and abstaining from critical United Nations votes, underscores its strategy to steer clear of direct clashes and portray an image of global stability and pacifism. Additionally, the Ukraine War has had significant global impacts on the economy, security, and international balance. Western countries are most affected and strongly condemn Putin's actions. However, Asian and "Global South" nations have a less clear stance. China's position is heavily influenced by its economic, political, and strategic interests worldwide. China, with its increasing global influence, has emerged as a potential mediator in the conflict, presenting a peace plan to end the destabilizing confrontation. China's role in this crisis is crucial as it is both a Russian ally and a rising global power. From an economic point of view, China is being heavily impacted by the instability in the Black Sea region, affecting energy prices and supply security. Nowadays China is facing severe economic challenges, including a slowdown, attributed to its extreme Zero-Covid policy. The country also grapples with a housing crisis and rising debt, leading to increased youth unemployment and decreased foreign investment. The US technological embargo further worsens China's economic and technological situation. However, from a political side, China and Russia have strengthened their strategic partnership, as they are both promoting a “multipolar world” in which rules are no longer based in western countries interest’s and. Both nations resist unipolarity and external interference. China's response to the invasion balances its economic interests with respect for international principles and regional stability. Therefore, China's stance is complex, reflecting its intricate interests and diplomatic approach. Initially, it abstained from UN resolutions on Crimea due to its non-interference policy. During the invasion, China abstained from condemning Russia in the UN Security Council, showcasing a calculated neutrality. China aspires to be a responsible global actor, emphasizing diplomacy and engagement. It has maintained direct communication with all parties involved, proposing a 12-point peace plan. While this plan might not have an immediate impact, it positions China as a mediator and a responsible actor preparing for its inevitable role in ending the conflict. The central question revolves around whether China's perspective will usher in a new world order. While the international liberal order is unlikely to completely vanish, it is undeniably undergoing profound transformations under the influence of China and other emerging powers. The future of the global system hinges on nations' capacity to adapt to these shifting realities and undertake substantial reforms to discover common ground in an increasingly intricate and interconnected world. The purpose of this work is to contribute a new perspective to the field of study on this matter. Starting from the premise that there is a clear crisis in the international liberal order, evidenced by the deterioration and delegitimization of the structures and institutions created after World War II and led by the West, we should ask ourselves: What is China’s perspective on international relations?

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