Burden of proof, implicit metaethical intuitions and moral objetivism

Abstract

Recently, Wagner et al. (2021) have developed a critique of the pro-moral objectivist metaethical position, based on what they call the “burden of proof argument” (p.2). This is basically a rejection of the fact that the burden of proof in the objectivism- non-moral objectivism debate lies with the non-objectivist position, and that this therefore results in an initial advantage for the objectivist position, the one that holds that there are moral truths. I argue in this paper that the argument fails on a central presupposition that is rejected by the objectivist stance: that moral truths depend on the epistemic states of a subject S or group G. Therefore, it is not relevant from a metaethical perspective what intuitions have, or do not have, a certain group G or subject S. Nevertheless, the consequences of holding the non-centrality of intuitions (Machery 2017) for a metaethical stance are assessed, and how intuitions cannot therefore be a way for a non-objectivist stance nor for an objectivist stance. This precludes reaching the central conclusion of the analysis developed by Wagner et alia (2021), namely that the default metaethical stance is what they call metaethical pluralism, and that a non-objectivist moral stance attributable from folk intuitions derives from this pluralism.