Keywords:
mental content, natural kind terms, externalism, internalismCopyright (c) 2012 S. Andrés
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
We intend to argue against a particular version of psychological externalism, that is, a strictly natural externalism. This theory is based on a problematic view of the semantic properties of natural kind terms; therefore, in the best possible scenario, strictly natural externalism ixes psychological distinctions which are not relevant for communicative purposes, and at its worst, it transforms mental individuation into an impossible task.
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