

of the lords of Hungary regarded King Sigismund “as a god”.⁴⁹ This early visit served as an opportunity for him to get acquainted with the members of the Polish and Hungarian political elite and gather information to be possibly used in the future. These ties involved indirect conversations to map the interests, concerns, and inclinations of actors who possessed political potential.

On the one hand, Rincón’s status as a rebel subject of Charles V might have influenced his capability to construct trust across Europe due to potential concerns regarding his shifting allegiance. On the other hand, as a lower-rank actor in the early 1520s gave him some leeway when travelling from one court to another, contacting influential individuals, and trying to gather information. A higher-rank actor would have been more likely to be spotted and trigger suspicion. In addition, Rincón’s growing familiarity with various power relations and political scenarios also gradually increased his status in French diplomacy and in the eyes of those who were interested in the creation of an anti-Habsburg network. It cannot be a coincidence that after the election of the Ottoman-supported John I, it was Antonio Rincón who was sent by the French king to revive former conversations and establish an alliance against the Habsburg brothers.

ESTABLISHING AGREEMENTS

Antonio Rincón’s mission in the early 1520s in Hungary and Poland gained political relevance in the second half of the decade. In the second case study of this contribution, I analyse how John I’s anti-Habsburg cooperation unfolded with Sultan Suleiman and Francis I. I examine these developments through the lens of the personal activities and contacts of Antonio Rincón and Hieronymus Łaski.

In August 1526, Sultan Suleiman I crucially defeated the Christian army at the Battle of Mohács where even King Louis II lost his life. A few months later, two kings were elected – János Szapolyai as John I, favoured by Sultan Suleiman and the majority of the nobility, and Archduke Ferdinand of Austria as Ferdinand I, supported by his brother, Emperor Charles V as well as other lords at the Hungarian royal court.⁵⁰ The conflict between the two claimants to the throne and the subsequent civil war provided a new opportunity for French diplomacy, and Rincón’s endeavours proved to be more fruitful this time. In May 1526, three months later, a new coalition, the League of Cognac, was founded by the Kingdoms of France and England, the Republics of Venice, Milan, and Florence, and the papacy, who aimed at confining Habsburg power over Europe which had been increasing after Charles V’s victory at Pavia in 1525. This is the context in which Antonio Rincón left France for Hungary for the second time in late February 1527, on behalf of Francis I and the League of Cognac, with the aim

⁴⁹ Ibidem, fol. 7, “nó solamente e potente de se ma etiam tuti ii S[ignori de Unga]ria, o la magior parte le tenen come un Dio etiam”.

⁵⁰ For a recent, thorough, and interdisciplinary discussion on the Battle of Mohács, see Szabolcs Varga, ed., *Elsüllyedt Mohács – Újabb tanulmányok a mohácsi csatával kapcsolatos kutatások eredményeiből* [Sunken Mohács – New studies from the results of research related to the Battle of Mohács] (Budapest: Martin Opitz Kiadó, 2023).

of offering anti-Habsburg help and a marriage alliance to John I. He arrived in Buda in June that year.

In his letter carried by Rincón, Francis I expressed his sadness at the disaster at Mohács and exhorted the newly crowned King John to protect his right to the throne by promising the support of the Cognac League.⁵¹ In his letter dated 3 July 1527, Rincón informed Andrea Gritti, Doge of the Venetian Republic (r. 1523–1538), about his arrival in Buda and the situation he found in the Hungarian capital. Rincón wrote that he was received by the Hungarian king and lords “as if he had come from heaven”.⁵² The envoy mentioned that he was about to travel to Sigismund I as the king of Poland was willing to contribute to the anti-Habsburg endeavours.⁵³ He presumably based this statement on the negotiations he had had with Sigismund five years before. Consequently, the French crown still tried to secure Polish support even after the failure of the 1524 Franco-Polish alliance. In his response, John I asked the king of France “to work for the good of our kingdom in such a way as for yours and to be towards us like a friend, confederate, father, relative, and patron”.⁵⁴ Of course, John did not forget to ask Francis to send him the greatest possible amount of money.⁵⁵ As Marino Sanuto, the Venetian historian and diarist summarised, this French mission to Buda was perceived to be very productive in European diplomatic circles.⁵⁶

The events of the period 1527–1529 connected the anti-Habsburg interests of Francis I, John I, and Sultan Suleiman, and the diplomatic endeavours of the three monarchs were tied together by the activities of a few individuals. On 23 September 1527, Antonio Rincón sent a letter to Anne, Duke of Montmorency, Grand Master of France and head of Francis I’s household, to ask for money from the French court in

⁵¹ Francis I to John I on 24 February 1527 (wrongly dated as 1526) in Ernest Charrière, ed., *Négociations de la France dans le Levant, ou Correspondances, mémoires et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France à Constantinople et des ambassadeurs, envoyés ou résidents à divers titres à Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jérusalem, en Turquie, Perse, Géorgie, Crimée, Syrie, Égypte, etc., et dans les États de Tunis, d’Alger et de Maroc*, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848), 155–158, 155. “Quamobrem pro nostra in vos benevolentia hortamur presentim alacrique animo jus vestrum tueamini, presentim cum in mentem venerit summum pontificem, potissimum Anglie regem, Venetorum rempublicam ac nos imprimis auxilio vestro nequaquam esse defuturos, tum vestra ipsius causa, tunc ne adversarius vester”. The manuscript can be found in BnF, Collection Dupuy, No. 468.

⁵² Fedérico Stefani et al., eds., *I diarii di Marino Sanuto*, vol. 45 (Venice: Visentini, 1896), col. 546, “Io fui receputo da questo Serenissimo re et da tutti signori hongari come se venisse dal cielo”. Rincón is quoted in the first-person singular as a copy of his letter to Gritti was inserted in Sanuto’s *I diarii*.

⁵³ Ibidem, col. 547, “Io mi partirò presto al re di Polonia, il quale è una cosa medema con questo Re, per confirmarlo che voglia aiutarlo come ho commissione dal Christianissimo re mio”.

⁵⁴ John I of Hungary to Francis I of France in Buda on 6 July 1527, *Monumenta Hungariae Historica 1. Diplomataria. 5: Magyar Történelmi Okmánytár, londoni könyv- és levéltárakból* [Hungarian Historical Documents from libraries and archives in London], 1521–1717, ed. Ernő Simonyi (Pest [today Budapest]: Eggenberger, 1859), no. 21, 134–137, 135, Votre Majesté est priée de travailler pour le salut de notre royaume dans telle mode que pour le votre même et qu’elle soit envers nous comme un ami, confédéré, père, parent et patron”. The manuscript can be found in BL, Bibliotheca Cottoniana, Vespasianus, F. I., no. 76.

⁵⁵ Ursu, *La politique orientale*, 43.

⁵⁶ Stefani et al., eds. *I diarii di Marino Sanuto*, vol. 45, col. 671, “L’andata di Porator del re christianissimo a quella Maiesta era stata molto fruttuosa”.

order to be able to help John I who had been attacked by Ferdinand I's troops.⁵⁷ On 27 September, John's army was defeated by the Habsburg forces at the Battle of Tokaj. At the same time, Hieronymus Łaski, John I's Polish envoy, embarked on a mission to Constantinople with the goal of requesting anti-Habsburg support from the sultan. At the Ottoman court, Łaski had a lengthy interaction with Ibrahim Pasha, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. These talks were facilitated by Alvise (also known as Lodovico) Gritti, the natural son of Doge Andrea Gritti and Ibrahim's friend, who was an influential economic actor in Constantinople, and later became Regent of Hungary (he held the office between 1530–1534).⁵⁸ Łaski wrote a diary of his mission that provides us with insight into the dynamics of his exchanges with the two lords, Ibrahim and Gritti. On 26 December, Łaski and Gritti met and discussed John I's situation. Łaski claimed:

[The pashas] will be more complaisant towards my lord if we refer to the money to be transferred from Venice, which is sent monthly to my lord by the most Christian king [Francis I] according to their alliance, namely that he gives thirty thousand crowns every month. Due to the war fought with Ferdinand, there is no safer way to transfer this money to Hungary than towards there [Venice] or Ragusa⁵⁹ but that [the former] seems safer to me.⁶⁰

The detailed nature of their conversation suggests a confidential relationship between Łaski and the Gritti whose economic influence in Constantinople contributed to his strategy to build a political career.⁶¹

⁵⁷ From Rincón to Montmorency on 23 September 1527. Charrière, ed., *Négociations*, 160–161. The manuscript can be found in BnF, Collection Béthune, No. 8537.

⁵⁸ See Ferenc Szakály, *Lodovico Gritti in Hungary 1529–1534: A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1995).

⁵⁹ The Republic of Ragusa was an aristocratic maritime republic in Dalmatia [today Dubrovnik, Croatia].

⁶⁰ Hieronymus Łaski's report about his Constantinople mission in 1527–1528 was published in Matthias Bel, ed., *Asparatus ad Historiam Hungariae, sive collectio Miscella, Momentorum ineditorum partim, partim editorum, sed fugentium* (Pozsony [today Bratislava, Slovakia], 1835), 159–189, 165, “Dominus meus intellexit, hic te agere, & pollere hic apud Bassas gratia: quare rogate, ut sis mihi consilio in ista porta, cuius ego consuetudinem nescio. Tamen, maius erit officium Domino meo, monstrando in transferendis pramiis ex Venetiis, quae singulis mensibus, Christianissimus Rex, Domino meo, vi confaederationis, sub nomine auxilii mittit Venetias, pro quolibet mense scilicet XXX. Millia coronarum dando. Haec pecunia propter bellum cum Ferdinando, per nullam aliam viam tutiorem Ungariam conduci, quam per hanc, aut per Aragusam possunt; tamen, tutior mihi ista videtur. Sed postquam habueris licentiam, publice huc ad mi veniendi, & sciuero, si hic pacem conficiam, tunc de pramiis hisce melius consulamus”. The original manuscript of Łaski's report was in Bel's possession when he compiled his volume, but we do not know what happened to the document afterwards. Gábor Barta published the source and stated in his introduction that he corrected the most obvious mistakes of Bel's text. See Gábor Barta, *Két tárgyalás Sztambulban: Hieronimus Łaski tárgyalása a törökönél János király nevében. Habardanecz János jelentése 1528. nyári sztambuli tárgyalásairól* [Two negotiations in Istanbul: Hieronimus Łaski's negotiation at the Turk on behalf of King John. János Habardanecz's report about his negotiations in the summer of 1528 in Istanbul] (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 1996). I consulted this edition and interpreted the text accordingly. ‘Crown’ refers to *écu* (*couronne*), the currency of the Kingdom of France at that time.

⁶¹ See Gizella Nemeth Papo and Adriano Papo, eds., *Ludovico Gritti: un principe mercante del Rinascimento tra Venezia, i turchi e la corona d'Ungheria* (Mariano del Friuli: Edizioni della Laguna, 2002).

Two days later, on 28 December, Łaski was interrogated by Ibrahim Pasha to arrange an agreement between John and Suleiman. Ibrahim wished to convince Łaski to “promise a tribute in the name of your king... Otherwise, we will not hand over Hungary either to your lord or to Ferdinand”.⁶² As a counter-argument and to emphasise the Christian monarchs’ unity, Łaski took a bold step and suggested the possibility of a war against the sultan, to be led by Francis I, by stating that “he [Francis] will resurrect even the dead against you because an infinite number of people will come with the French king...”.⁶³ In light of the anti-Habsburg interests shared by Suleiman and Francis, we can regard Łaski’s claim as a rhetorical attempt to strengthen his king’s position in the obviously unequal power relation with the sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

Łaski’s mission to the Porte resulted in a so-called “treaty of friendship and fraternity” between John and Suleiman on 29 February 1528.⁶⁴ This agreement proved to be a vassal relationship throughout the king’s reign. The War of the League of Cognac against the House of Habsburg was not about to come to an end. In fact, Hungary’s potential to facilitate the League’s position on the Italian front became evident to the King of France. The Kingdom of Hungary had a geopolitically crucial location in the central part of the continent, between the expanding spheres of Habsburg and Ottoman influence. Francis I realised that by supporting John Szapolyai, he could prolong the kingdom’s internal power feud, divert a significant part of Habsburg financial and military resources, and eventually, destabilise and weaken the easternmost lands of the enemy dynasty. The fragmented Kingdom of Hungary thus became a tool in French great power strategy.

Therefore, Antonio Rincón travelled to Hungary again. He joined Polish soldiers in a battle against Ferdinand I in early 1528. Peter Tomicki, Sigismund I’s strongly anti-Habsburg vice-chancellor, wrote that Rincón “was among the infantry, who fought with great courage”.⁶⁵ Arguably, the Castilian played a multifaceted role as a diplomatic and military actor, maintaining ties with multiple courts and individuals.

It was in the late 1520s when the goals of Rincón’s journey in the early 1520s were achieved. On 16 May 1528, John I issued a letter of credence for another envoy, John Statileo, bishop of Alba Iulia (Transylvania), in which the purpose and tasks of a mission to France were outlined. Statileo was fully commissioned to:

⁶² Bel, *Asparatus*, 170, “Obsequere consilio meo, fac Domino meo honorem, nomine Regis tui, promitte tributum, stabit Dominus tuus eo melius, quam alias. Nam aliter, nec Domino tuo, nec Ferdinando, Hungaria cedemus”.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, 171, “Quae res, si sortietur effectum, credo & mortuos, ut ita dicam, contra vos surrecturos; quia cum rege Francia ibunt infiniti, qui cum alio ire etiam nec cogitassent”.

⁶⁴ AT 10, no. 88, 97–98, and also nos. 97–98. On Ottoman-Hungarian relations, see Gábor Barta, “A Forgotten Theatre of War 1526–1528 (Historical Events Preceding the Ottoman–Hungarian Alliance of 1528)”, in *Hungarian-Ottoman military and diplomatic relations in the age of Süleyman the Magnificent*, ed. Pál Fodor and Géza Dávid (Budapest: Eötvös Loránd University/Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1994), 93–130.

⁶⁵ Tomicki to the Castellan of Poznan in *ibidem*, no. 136, 145–146, 145, “... erat inter pedites, qui satis animose pugnarunt”.

travel between His Majesty [Francis I] and ourselves [John I], and to initiate, make, and strengthen good friendship, brotherhood, understanding, and alliance. We entrust him to arrange all the things in our name, generally and particularly to do, arrange, and exercise that which are necessary and advantageous around the previously mentioned friendship, brotherhood, tie, and alliance.⁶⁶

The letter specifically mentioned a prospective alliance between the two monarchs and projected “a more special mandate” for further negotiations.⁶⁷ John I endowed Statileo with full legal power regarding negotiating and concluding a royal coalition in which the interests and ambitions of both crowns could be preserved. On 4 June, we find John Statileo and Antonio Rincón together in Plock, Poland, as indicated in a letter written to Peter Tomicki by the humanist Andreas Krzycki who hosted the two envoys in his own house.⁶⁸ A brief note on the provision of accommodation proves the key importance of personal connections, trust, and friendships in the successful performance of cross-continental diplomatic duties. Statileo and Rincón were travelling from Poland to England between late June and early August 1528.

The English adventure of Rincón and Statileo is worth considering against the backdrop of European geopolitics in the period. Jean du Bellay, Francis I’s ambassador to London, reported to Montmorency about the arrival of two men at the English court on 8 August.⁶⁹ On 11 August, Rincón wrote to Montmorency that they had been detained by Cardinal and Lord Chancellor Thomas Wolsey.⁷⁰ The use of the word “detained” suggests that the leader of English diplomacy, who was eagerly following the developments of Franco-Habsburg relations on the continent, had a distrust in the Franco-Hungarian agents and found it important to explore their agenda. He interrogated the envoys about John I’s position in Hungary. Through Wolsey, Henry VIII (r. 1509–1547) promised a financial contribution to John’s struggles.⁷¹ By the second half of 1528, John I’s role as a counterweight to Habsburg supremacy became increasingly crucial due to numerous unfortunate events from the French perspective. For example, in June 1528, Andrea Doria, captain-general of the French royal navy, changed sides and started to serve Emperor Charles V as he had been dissatisfied with

⁶⁶ AN, J 995, No. 27. Letter of credence issued by John I for John Statileo in Tarnów on 16 May 1528, “... proficiscendi ac inter Maiestatem suam et inter nos, bonam amiciciam fraternitatem intelligenciam et confederacionem ineundi faciendi stabiliendique, et se nomine ac vice nostra ad omnia obligandi, generaliter vero omnia et singula faciendi, disponendi et exercendi, que circa premissam amiciciam fraternitatem ligam et confederacionem necessaria opportunaque fuerint”.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, “Etiam si talia forent, que mandatum exigerent magis speciale, quam presentibus est expressum, promittentes in verbo nostro regio ac bona fide nostra mediante omnia et singula, que per dictum oratorem nostrum [fiunt]”.

⁶⁸ AT 10, no. 272, 260.

⁶⁹ Victor-Louis Bourrilly, ed., *Ambassades en Angleterre de Jean du Bellay: La première ambassade (Septembre 1527 – Février 1529). Correspondance Diplomatique* (Paris: Picard, 1905), no. 135, 371–372.

⁷⁰ Charrière, ed., *Négociations*, 161, “Io seria in diligentia in continenti andato, ma monsignor il cardinal me a detenuto.” The manuscript can be found in BnF, Collection Béthune, No. 8574.

⁷¹ Federico Stefani et al., eds. *I diarii di Marino Sanuto*, vol. 49 (Venice: Visentini, 1897), col. 442.

the remuneration he received from Francis I.⁷² As his Italian expedition was failing, a new anti-Habsburg alliance seemed to be a rational step on the French king's part. Arguably, the arrival of two anti-Habsburg agents in London signified developments to be followed from the English point of view.

The Franco-Hungarian alliance was concluded in Paris in September 1528 by John Statileo and Francis I. It laid down the principle that “friends and enemies of the other should be acknowledged and they should be friends and enemies of both [kings]”.⁷³ John I promised to avoid any peace, pact, or agreement with Ferdinand I and offered military support for French aims in the war between the Habsburgs and the League of Cognac for Italy in the form of light cavalry and infantry. Francis vowed that:

... he will really and in fact give and pay twenty thousand golden scudi to sustain the burden of war and will negotiate as far as he can with his allies and confederates so that they contribute from their parts some sum of money to the already mentioned king of Hungary for the maintenance of his war.⁷⁴

The men involved in Franco-Hungarian diplomatic negotiations were in regular contact and informed each other about the major developments in European political and military affairs. One example is Antonio Rincón's correspondence with Jan Łaski, the brother of Hieronymus Łaski who bore the same name as their uncle, Archbishop Jan Łaski. In his letter written in November 1528 to Rincón, Jan reported about John I's return to Hungary, the military help provided by the sultan as well as the Ottoman plans of marching against Vienna. At the beginning of the letter, he emphasised:

I would have written to your lordship a lot that concern the matters of our lord, the most serene king of Hungary [John I], but I do not have the cypher with me now, with which everything would have been written safely, and now it is barely safe to write anything in a letter.⁷⁵

This note testifies to the regular communication between Antonio Rincón and Jan Łaski as well as a variety of tools and methods they needed to use in order to avoid the attention of Habsburg authorities and exchange information in a safe and efficient manner. In March 1529, Rincón was once again dispatched by Francis I with the

⁷² Luigi Villari, “Doria, Andrea”, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. 8, 11th ed., ed. Hugh Chisholm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), 425.

⁷³ AN, J 995, No. 18, “inter dictos principes erit perpetua fraternitas, unio, confederatio et amicitia eorumque successores et heredes, que sit /adeo stabilis et firma, ut nullo tempore valeat interrumpi”.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, “et interim et ex nunc donabit et numerabit realiter et de facto viginti milia scutorum auri pro sustinendo onere belli et procurabit pro suo posse quod sui alligati et confederati ex eorum partibus contribuant aliquam pecunie summam iamdicto regi Hungarie pro sustentacione sui belli”.

⁷⁵ AT 10, no. 448, 431–432, “Essent mihi multa scribenda ad tuam Dtionem, quae negotium serenissimi Hungariae regis domini nostri concernerent, sed et cyfras illas mecum nunc non habeo, quibus omnia tuto scribi potuissent, et nunc vix totum est quidquam literis committere”.

commission of transporting forty thousand *écus* to John I.⁷⁶ The Franco-Hungarian alliance was ratified in Buda in September 1529 in the Castilian's presence.

Nevertheless, Hieronymus Łaski's career did not culminate in his pro-John accomplishments. In the early 1530s, he got involved in a plan of conspiracy for the Hungarian throne with Alvise Gritti who facilitated his talks with Ibrahim Pasha in 1528–1529. After the plot had been discovered, Łaski also switched sides and started to serve Ferdinand. Arguably, the instability of Hungarian domestic politics had an impact on larger-scale great power affairs as it created opportunities for adventurous individuals to practice their agency and gain influence and income. Moreover, since both the political coalitions of dynasties and the allegiances between patrons and envoys were highly unsteady in sixteenth-century Europe, it can be claimed that the behaviour of envoys mirrored patterns of “high politics”.

CONCLUSION

In his 2021 article on late medieval Franco-Hungarian relations, Attila Györkös asserted that in the early sixteenth century the Kingdom of France proved to be the more proactive party, while the Kingdom of Hungary was not interested in getting involved in the main preoccupations of French politics – the Italian Wars and the rivalry between the Houses of Valois-Angoulême and Habsburg.⁷⁷ Györkös also pointed out that the French court was not familiar with the Central European region and its geopolitical circumstances, let alone the different interests and problems of the polities in the area. Because of treating the region rather superficially as a sort of “Jagiellon Central Europe” (hence Rincón's joint mission in Hungary and Poland), French diplomacy was not able to achieve long-term diplomatic success there.⁷⁸

When looking at interstate or interdynastic relations through the prism of the sovereigns' aims and interests with a top-down approach, we see a limited list of negotiations and agreements, and in our case, one tangible achievement – the ratified Franco-Hungarian alliance of 1528–1529. We shall, therefore, move “downwards” and examine foreign ties from the perspective of their actors and architects, who travelled across courts and polities, searched for contacts, conducted talks, observed their interlocutors, and reported about their experiences. In doing so, it is possible to uncover formerly unseen correlations and analyse the personality, performance, and office of diplomats.

Investigating the nature of relationships and the dynamics of interactions between our protagonists and the people with whom they exchanged information in the 1520s has allowed us to enhance our understanding of how Franco-Hungarian diplomacy developed in the period. Antonio Rincón and Hieronymus Łaski carried out multiple missions on behalf of their monarchs with the aim of establishing effective alliances against the increasing power of Habsburgs. As they were trying to connect the rulers of distant lands with one another, they established and nurtured

⁷⁶ BnF, Clairambault, 1215, fol. 69.

⁷⁷ Györkös, “Francia-magyar diplomáciai kapcsolatok (1499–1529)”, 527.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, 528.

numerous relations and carried a large amount of news and information through a range of political entities and princely centres.

The sources analysed in this article highlighted the less formal and direct interactions of Rincón and Łaski, along with the significance of the emotions they showed and observed and the services they performed and received. These often overlooked nuances improve our knowledge of the ways in which these actors understood local and continental geopolitical changes as well as how they made sense of the actions of the individuals they met and talked with. Thus, the accounts and letters written by and about Rincón and Łaski help us explore how the “diplomat’s craft” was practiced in pre-modern Europe.

Finally, the Franco-Habsburg and Habsburg-Ottoman imperial competitions have traditionally been studied separately – and so have been the people and information associated with the Mediterranean and Central European theatres of war. Their circulation *between* these conflict and diplomatic zones has not been extensively explored. The protagonists of Franco-Hungarian and Hungarian-Ottoman relations visited the major power centres of the continent to obtain tangible support and also to map and strengthen sympathetic sentiments. The close examination of their activities and networks through their correspondence shows a fluid connection between spheres. Our case studies have demonstrated that Antonio Rincón and Hieronymus Łaski exchanged news and information with a number of individuals other than monarchs and shaped their strategies according to these interactions. Due to the distance from their home courts and the frequency of unexpected circumstances, these envoys developed their own mechanisms for dealing with hostile and amicable environments alike. Indeed, with a microhistorical approach, we can shed light on a wide array of actors’ agencies and the role that their encounters and networks played in the developments of “high politics”, particularly the increasing interconnectedness of anti-Habsburg efforts in the 1520s. Therefore, this article challenges traditional divisions between the diplomatic arenas of the Western and the Eastern parts of Europe and offers a fresh framework for the discussion of sixteenth-century foreign relations.

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