MODELS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, CAMOCIO’S ISOLARIO, AND EARLY MODERN SHOWINGS AND TELLINGS IN LIGHT OF LEPANTO

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ABSTRACT

This essay proposes three models of Mediterranean space and action that emerge out of early modern narratives and visuals (particularly maps). These overlapping models, for the long sixteenth century, are: 1) itinerary; 2) empire; and 3) predator, all of which appear under the broader frame of geographic-commercial space that is either conflicted or pacific. I employ a preliminary narrative, The Deeds of Commander Pietro Mocenigo, by Coriolano Cippico, a galley commander in the Ottoman-Venetian conflict of 1470-1474; then, the isolario of Giovanni Camocio, as it appeared in the aftermath of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Camocio’s maps focus attention on that battle and on imperial conflict. But his vision of the Mediterranean is that of a range of familiar, maritime spaces dotted with fortresses and harbors, sometimes enmeshed in conflict and more often not.

KEY WORDS: Lepanto; Mediterranean; Ottoman empire; Venice; maps.

RESUMEN

En este artículo se presentan y analizan tres modelos del Mediterráneo del siglo XVI que surgen de narraciones y elementos visuales típicos de la temprana edad moderna, tal como los mapas. Dichos modelos, para lo que concierne el siglo XVI, son: 1) itinerario, 2) imperial y 3) predatorio. Todos ellos se involucran dentro de un marco más amplio, el del espacio geográfico-comercial conflictivo o pacífico. Para su análisis se empleará, en primer lugar, una narración preliminar basada en The Deeds of Commander Pietro Mocenigo de Coriolano Cippico, comandante de una galera en el conflicto otomano-veneciano de 1470-1474. A raíz de este primer análisis, la investigación se enfocará en el isolario de Giovanni Camocio, tal y como apareció tras la batalla de Lepanto en 1571. De manera particular, al explorar los mapas de Camocio,
that centran la atención en la batalla y en el conflicto imperial, se mostrará la representación del Mediterráneo como contexto conformado por una serie de espacios marítimos familiares, repletos de fortalezas y puertos, a veces envueltos en conflictos y otras veces no.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Lepanto; Mediterráneo; Imperio otomano; Venecia; mapas.

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INTRODUCTION

The English physician and traveler Edward Brown, describing his journey from Vienna to Istanbul in a volume published in 1673, depicted Hungary in terms of two framing devices: the rivers that bounded the country, and the defeat of an Ottoman army, commanded by the grand vezir, by the forces of the Hapsburg empire. «The discourse» of that defeat, he wrote, «was fresh, when I was at the city of Raab; and many I found who saw the corpses of Men and Horses floating in that stream [the Danube] […]»¹ Brown was writing long after the battle of Lepanto in 1571; and he was narrating land and riverine travel. I cannot help but think, however, that his three descriptive categories (boundaries, imperial battles, and the witnessing of bodies floating in the water) serve very well to characterize much of the historiography of the early modern Mediterranean before and after the emblematic battle of Lepanto. Water crossings, riverine or seaborne, for one thing, were both the bane of military endeavors and the marker of the limits of political authority. I invoke Brown’s account here because he, like others before and after who showed and told the Mediterranean in the early modern era, saw that seascapes and landscapes were a reflection of various pasts, stages for the enactment of human and imperial dramas, and challenges to the traveler who required equal parts of knowledge, endurance, engagement, and resources².

Brown, like many other narrators of the Middle Sea was also preoccupied with a question that preoccupies me in this essay: What was the role of the Ottomans in the early modern conceptualization of space, history, and power politics? In addressing that question, Brown placed the Ottomans in a historical hierarchy of empires whose ambitions encompassed the Mediterranean.

Though Augustus [Caesar] thought it a point of wisdom, to put some limit unto the Roman Empire, yet I do not find the Turks are of his judgment, but still endeavor

to enlarge their Dominions, and when I consider that people, their hardy education, sober course of life, and obedience to their Superiors; [...] I am apt to think or fear, if he, who putteth bounds on the Sea, and saith hither thou shalt come and no further, doth not, out of his great mercy, put a stop to their further incursions they may probably obtain and conserve a far larger Empire, and even all Europe, unto the Western Ocean.3

Placing boundaries on the sea, for Brown, was thus an endeavor both human and divine; though in what follows I shall deal primarily with the former. I conclude with the idea of an Ottoman Mediterranean. But first I want to consider some default paradigm(s) of the Mediterranean in a long sixteenth century surrounding the iconic battle of Lepanto/İnebahtı in 1571, in which a Christian coalition (led by Spain and Venice) defeated an Ottoman fleet in the contested territory of the Ionian Sea. Then, I propose a set of models of Mediterranean space and action that emerge out of early modern narratives and visuals (particularly maps) of the Mediterranean. The dividing line between “narratives” and “visuals” (the showings and tellings of my title) is not, of course, a firm one; but those designations here mean written narrative sources, and the illustrations that accompanied them (either physically or in the narrative imagination). The three proposed, overlapping models are: 1) itinerary; 2) empire; 3) and predator, all of which appear under the broader frame of geographic and commercial space that is, further, depicted as either conflicted or pacific. While historiography has often focused on the imperial as a primary mode for envisioning the Mediterranean, the sources I present here are also inclined toward an emphasis on the itinerary and on predatory space4. That is: What segments of the Mediterranean, delineated how, are of elemental concern? along with the question of who is doing (or can do) what to whom in the relevant segments of the Sea. And, just as there is no firm boundary between narrative and image, there is no firm boundary between sea and land, except perhaps that boundary between the far-sea and near-sea (that which lies within reach of the land). Early modern narrators (and mapmakers) tended to depict Mediterranean space in terms of islands and coasts, coastal settlements, and hinterlands, with rivers providing an inlet from coastal space into the settlements of the hinterlands. The sea that was not within reach of the land was the space beyond.

This analysis presumes a set of questions, most of which can only be raised rather than answered. There is an enormous body of scholarship on the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the following questions remain highly relevant. What happens if one does not start with empire and faith, or even robbery and violence? That, of course, is what world, environmental, and even cultural historians do: look at a “big picture”, focus on those things that transcend political boundaries, or even human endeavor. Much has been done to expand our vision of the Mediterranean beyond both conflict and consumption. But that is not really what I intend here.

3 Brown, A Brief Account, 82-83.
Regardless of the evidence of expansive and enduring triumphal rhetorics in the Christian kingdoms of Europe, one still has to ask the question: Who cares about the Battle of Lepanto and how? What did it mean to the peoples of the coastal Adriatic, for example, as opposed to peoples at a distance?

Another ongoing question is, does gender play a role? When I think of gender and the Mediterranean, what comes to mind are the ethnographic vignettes on early modern maps and the similarly ethnographic descriptions of travelers from the Christian kingdoms of Europe, or from the Ottoman empire, like Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682). Those travelers use women as a marker of boundaries for certain types of space, often as one moved from Christian imperial to Muslim imperial territory. Stopping places were, after all, looking places. Some travelers fail to mention women at all. Others characterize the women of the various places on their itineraries in terms of dress, character, beauty, visibility, and sometimes occupation and sexuality. The Mediterranean was told as an ethnographic sea in which types were pasted onto spaces; and the ethnographic sea is a gendered sea. Nicolas de Nicolay, a pioneer in the presentation of print ethnographic illustrations of Ottoman women comes to mind.

Gender, of course, is not limited to women, but in an era when the travel narrative, not to mention its inhabitants, is overwhelmingly male, then the gendering of space becomes an exercise in noting default society and its alternatives. Eric Dursteler’s recent essay, “Language and Gender in the Early Modern Mediterranean”, suggests some of the possibilities for modeling the White Sea using gender. He divides Mediterranean terrain on the basis of female multilingualism and “cross-linguistic intimacy”, for example, providing a telling alternative to divisions of the Mediterranean based on imperial identity or faith.

Walter Andrews and Mehmet Kalpaklı have taken an alternate approach, analyzing the Mediterranean literary salon as a trans-imperial and transregional source of political, cultural, and sexual power and interaction. In the early modern world, many of the travel sources we employ are those produced by men who participated in such homosocial gatherings. Beyond the models I address here, we might see the Mediterranean as an ethnography of its women (or its men), relatively devoid of battles if not of other sorts of violence, or as what might be called a literatography of its salons (male, female, or trans-gender). Maps too are gendered,

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including representations of the supposedly “real” and the strictly iconic, so we might divide the mapped Mediterranean on the basis of who appears within the map frame: soldiers, traders, clerics, officials, villagers, refugees, and emblems of nation or of ideology. Often enough, of course, no embodiment of the peoples in Mediterranean spaces appears at all.

What if we focused first on the visual and narrative imagination of the Mediterranean (maps and travel accounts), rather than on an event or its protagonists? Then, where does Lepanto stand? Is it a gulf, a proof of imperial power, a coastal background, a destination, a stop on an itinerary? Is it an aberration, a celebration, one event among many, a measure of who can get or do what? Does it prove Christendom is ascendant (yes, for some), or does it show the dominance of Islamdom that such a coalition had to be put together in the first place? What does Lepanto look like? What, in effect, is the ‘geography’ of various types of narratives or visuals? These are not new ideas. But I want to use the stopping place and event of Lepanto to launch a case study about what certain specific showings and tellings actually say about Mediterranean space. My primary case study here is the isolario, or island book, of Giovanni Francesco Camocio, a publisher, printer, and cartographer active in Venice. Camocio’s collection of maps, entitled (in English translation), *Famous islands, ports, fortresses, and maritime territories subject to the Most Serene Republic of Venice, other Christian Princes, and the Turkish Sultan, newly brought to light,* was apparently first assembled before the battle of Lepanto but was updated in several editions thereafter to include maps depicting the battle and its environs.

**MODELS**

I propose three overlapping models that were commonly employed both to show and tell the Mediterranean world of the early modern era. These models are contained within two overarching frames. The first is of war and peace, or, rather, violence and (relative) tranquility. Mediterranean places are depicted, particularly visually, as either pacific or as sites of conflict. The second frame is what one might call the geographic-commercial. This frame takes for granted that the Mediterranean is divided into the sea, islands, shore and ports, hinterlands, and various extensions of the sea inland via land routes and rivers. It reflects the ways in which this space was mapped and understood in the early modern imagination. That understanding presumes that the sea mattered because it provided humans access to commodities. A dangerous space, the Mediterranean was approached for purposes that were generally commercial. This old and persuasive frame takes into account: goods, transport, routes,

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9 Elsewhere I have characterized the mapping of Ottoman space as employing: historical space, war space, travel space and sacred space. Palmina Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans: Sovereignty, Territory, and Identity in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 22-35.
and ports as well as people and their trajectories (that is travel, such as the labor and tourist flows illustrated by Julia Clancy-Smith for a later era)\(^\text{10}\). Among other things, the geographic-commercial frame allows us to look at the ways in which the impetus to trade and profit both allowed the circumvention of political agendas and determined the fates of men. As William Shakespeare, in *The Merchant of Venice*, had it:

> Hath all his ventures failed…
> From Tripolis, from Mexico, and England,
> From Lisbon, Barbary, and India,
> And not one vessel scape the dreadful touch
> Of merchant-marring rocks?\(^\text{11}\)

Under the umbrellas of these conflict and geographic-commercial frames, one finds my three models. The itinerary model takes for granted mobility, the impetus of humans to navigate onto and around the sea. It moves beyond discrete spaces to show the routes taken by ships, travelers and the commercial agents who employed them, one port at a time. It answers the questions: How does one get from here to there? and, What do the stopping places look like? Itineraries suggest the flows of people, goods, and culture around the Mediterranean basin and its extensions. Trajectories could be long or short; but the itinerary shows the segments of travel by which the separate spaces of the Mediterranean (Venice to Cyprus, Malta to Algiers) could be traversed and connected. There are anchor islands like Cyprus; and then there are subsidiary islands that seldom attracted sailors or travelers. The second model is the empire model. This model is often the default found in depictions of the early modern Mediterranean. It assigns ownership to Mediterranean spaces based on the actions and aspirations of major political players in the region. Thus, one finds a Spanish or a Venetian or an Ottoman Mediterranean touching the shores of the territories controlled, more or less, by those polities, despite the fact that any kind of “control” of the sea was elusive at best. Maps, chronicles, and pilgrim narratives, not to mention more contemporary historiography, have labelled Mediterranean space with the names

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\(^\text{11}\) William Shakespeare, *The Complete Works*, eds. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 496: “The Comical History of the Merchant of Venice,” Act 3, scene 2, lines 265-269. The play was in the Stationers’ Register on July 22, 1598, and the editors suggest it was written in 1596 or 1597 when Lepanto was still fresh in the memories of the Christian kingdoms.
of imperial entities and their monarchs. It is this imperial model that was challenged by, among others, the world history model of Janet Abu Lughod, the micro-zone histories of Horden and Purcell, and the environmental or climate models of various world historians. Paradigms that look at the Mediterranean as a conduit in much larger systems of exchange have been most useful in presenting an alternative to political models of the Mediterranean space. In these paradigms it is commercial, artistic, literary, and ideological exchange rather than imperial power that is transcendent. Marshall Hodgson provided an early and compelling example of that violation of political boundaries in the Afro-Eurasian oikumene. And yet the imperial model was dominant in the rhetorics of early modern authors and artists. My third model is the predator model; this model views the sea as a watery avenue by which various predators maneuvered to steal or destroy persons and property, by both sea and land. This model reveals, for example, captains, captives, court cases, and ransom negotiations. I have purposely avoided the label “pirate” for this model because, as suggested by various scholars, the boundaries between war and theft, captains and corsairs, navies and less formal kinds of fleet, are visibly and significantly flexible. The images of Mediterranean spaces captured on maps showing the battle fleet of one empire confronting that of another do little justice to the raiding, ruination, and booty-taking accomplished by ships either tightly or loosely associated with states and their administrators.

Other models of the Mediterranean highlight periodization and the geographic division of Mediterranean space. What difference might it make, for example, if we count the Mediterranean in the long sixteenth century in terms of Ottoman reigns, from Bayezid II (1481-1512) through Mustafa I (two reigns, 1617-18 and 1622-23). A good discussion of various of the possible frameworks may be found in O’Connell and Dursteler’s, The Mediterranean World. These authors call the period of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the «Age of the Corsair in the Mediterranean», with the years 1580-1620 serving as the «most intense period of corsair activity».

12 Of course, the geographic models of the sea cannot be clearly separated from imperial (or military) models. Anastasia Stouraiti, “Printing Empire: Visual Culture and the Imperial Archive in Seventeenth-Century Venice,” The Historical Journal 59, no. 3 (2016): 635-668, notes imperial influence over various types of communication and the importance of print making for visualizing the Ottoman-Venetian wars.
17 Monique O’Connell and Eric Dursteler, The Mediterranean World from the Fall of Rome to the Rise of Napoleon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 178-281, who look, for example, at commercial, imperial, migration, piratic, and environmental models.
18 Ibidem, 251.
I would suggest that using a model of predation in the Mediterranean, rather than piracy, makes that era somewhat less distinctive. In any case, one might ask what is the relation of the clash at Lepanto to this notion of enhanced corsair activity. The periodization of the early modern and the long sixteenth century varies, of course, depending on what factors of Mediterranean existence one is assessing. We can look at the Middle Sea, for example, as a huge basin (dotted with commercial ports) for the taking and ransoming of slaves. Ali Atabey, like O’Connell and Dursteler, takes the post Lepanto era, «the end of the Ottoman-Venetian War of Cyprus in 1573 and the Ottoman-Hapsburg truce of 1581», as signaling a period of «increasing piracy». Joshua White, too, in a telling case study that links the activity of North African corsairs in the eastern Mediterranean to Cossack incursions in the Black Sea, Ottoman policy formation, Mediterranean diplomacy, and shifting naval technology, proposes an elemental shift in activity of and response to sea raiders in the decades following Lepanto. Idris Bostan provides an analysis of the divisions of Mediterranean space and their official status in an article on the Ottomans’ admirals, or kapudan pasha. Using Ottoman sources, he points up conflicting visions of Mediterranean space, and concludes that the province of the Islands of the White Sea, allocated to the kapudan, and the province of North Africa (“Islands” of the West) remained separate in the Ottoman conceptualizations of space and authority. Traditionally, we have divided

19 Mike Carr, “Review of That Most Precious Merchandise: The Mediterranean Trade in Black Sea Slaves, 1260-1500, by Hannah Barker (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019),” International Journal of Middle East Studies 53, no. 3 (2021): 551-552, argues «that the slave trade was not conducted by professional slave traders, but by opportunist merchants who bought and sold slaves alongside other commodities and transported them on mixed-cargo ships». See also, Maryna Kravets and Victor Ostapchuk, “Cossacks as Captive-Takers in the Ottoman Black Sea Region and Unfreedom in the Northern Countries,” in Slavery in the Black Sea Region, c. 900-1900: Forms of Unfreedom at the Intersection between Christianity and Islam, ed. Felicia Roşu (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 251-54. The Black Sea serves as a watery extension of the Mediterranean with the flow of goods like slaves moving both ways, so that Caffa could be considered a secondary Mediterranean port. The authors suggest “raiding zones”, illustrating the question of how far inland one might conceptualize “Mediterranean raiding”. Fariba Zatinbehaf, Mediterranean Encounters: Trade and Pluralism in Early Modern Galata (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), 56-58, notes the concentration of slaves (which increased in times of war) and manumitted slave populations in Mediterranean ports like Galata.


the Ottoman Mediterranean into the Levant (Cyprus and east), the Adriatic/Aegean (Archipelago), and Barbary. There is utility to this model which reflects, in part, imperial spheres of interest. But the three spaces, like their ships and passengers, flow into and out of each other. So, in addition to the question of periodization, there remain the question of who and what flows when and where, the question of how each polity imagined authority over these sea spaces, and the question of how these spaces were mapped in narratives and visuals.

Lepanto, of course, is a happening, an instigator of information and misinformation. It is a prominent marker in the timeline between the Ottoman conquests of Constantinople and Cairo and the seventeenth century emergence of Western European powers as conquerors, or rather linkers, of the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Indian seas. It looms large as an icon of the power of European Christian kings (if not as a symbol of their naval dominance), or at least as a received indication of divine favor at the expense of the imperial reach of the Ottoman Muslim polity. Lepanto, after all, was logistically important, but it was not clearly a radically transformational naval victory. Still, it can be evaluated in terms of celebrations and aspirations. There were the shame of, and a shrug from, the Ottomans who quickly rebuilt their fleet. There were the years-long festivities in Venice and elsewhere in Europe accompanied by an outpouring of print, story, poetry, and song. Individual powers and peoples had to imagine and depict what exactly this event meant for the envisioning of Mediterranean territory and resources. The thrill of victory had to be balanced with the pragmatic assessment of ongoing policy. And Lepanto had to be distributed to readers, hearers, and lookers in ways that were appealing, lucrative, and acceptable to political overseers. Here below are two relevant examples, one a predecessor from the later fifteenth century, the second a mapping of the Mediterranean that was altered in the aftermath of the Battle itself.

TELLING THE PREDATOR, AN EARLY EXAMPLE IN CORIOLANO CIPPICO

Examples of predatory spaces, defined by predatory behavior, are not difficult to find in the literatures of the early modern Mediterranean. Those who lived by the sea, its ports, and its commercial routes could not escape the nightmare of the raid that three zones of “piracy” from the Adriatic to Anatolia as suggested in the Ottoman important affairs (mühmme) registers.

23 Dana Sajdi, “In Other Worlds? Mapping Out the Spatial Imaginaries of 18th-Century Chroniclers from the Ottoman Levant (Bilād al-Shām),” Journal of Ottoman Studies/Osmanlı Araştırmaları 44 (2014): 363-64, 388-89, provides an engaging assessment of spatial worldview in 18th century Ottoman chronicles which takes into account factors such as the profession of the author, as well as empire and faith, to narrate spaces such as the Levant.

24 For an assessment of the ways in which those aspirations were negotiated somewhat earlier, and a view of the complicated nature of imperial claims, see Francesco Caprioli, “The Sheep and the Lion: Charles V, Barbarossa, and Hapsburg Diplomatic Practice in the Muslim Mediterranean (1534-1542),” Journal of Early Modern History 25 (2021): 414-417. Indeed, the rhetorical construction of the Ottoman-Hapsburg struggle for Tunis, in its various tellings, provides an intriguing case study for a comparison to the showings and tellings of Lepanto.

Librosdelacorte.es, PRIMAVERA-VERANO, nº 26, año 15 (2023). ISSN 1989-6425
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15366/ldc2023.15.26.015
materialized from the sea. In fact, despite the multiple variants of the tale of the Terrible Turk in the kingdoms of Christian Europe and beyond, when it came to the raider from the sea, one might give Venice privilege of place. An eloquent illustration of the work of the predator, in the seas around Venice during the Signoria’s ongoing clash with the Ottomans, can be found in a Latin text composed by Coriolano Cippico (1425-1493), a Dalmatian noble from Trau, about one hundred years before Lepanto.

Cippico, a humanist and diplomat, served Venice as a galley captain under Pietro Mocenigo from 1470-1474. Kiril Petkov suggests that Cippico’s The Deeds of Commander Pietro Mocenigo is an exercise in «local civic patriotism», rather than simply a paean to Venetian imperial interests, despite its eulogizing of Mocenigo. In any case, Cippico gives an enthusiastic and expansive description of predation. He begins the tale of Mocenigo’s command in 1470 by saying that the commander sailed to Greece traversing «all the cities and islands of that province», comforting «subjects and confederates». He accused the Ottomans, who had taken Chalcis, of behaving like a thief from an ambush [...] subjecting to depredations what belonged to others». After taking command of the Venetian fleet, the season being late, he sent the galleys that did not need repair to the islands of the Archipelago. Action in 1471 was delayed as the Porte and the Signoria engaged in a series of failed peace negotiations. But, late in the year, Mocenigo sailed to the Aegean; and, hearing that a «wealthy settlement in Ionia had been left defenseless», he planned an attack. Currently under the Genoese, the settlement was called «Passing by the locals, and is situated on the mainland opposite the island of Chios». Cippico noted that the shops were «overflowing with goods».

In the deep of night, the commander brought the fleet to shore in the vicinity of the settlement. The soldiers and the galleys’ fighting contingents disembarked, accompanied by not a small number of hired allies... Terrified by the unexpected assault of our troops, the residents fled to the nearby mountain. Our people entered the village and found it vacated by its inhabitants but chock-full of commodities for sale: silk cloths, embroidered woolens called giambelotti, colorful carpets and other precious wares. They looted it and took the booty to the galleys; whatever was not worth taking away they burned, setting it to fire.

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26 Cippico, The Deeds, xix-xx. Mocenigo was charged with recovering Negroponte from the Ottomans and inflicting «as much damage on the Ottoman–controlled Levantine coasts as possible».

27 Ibidem, xxvii-xxix, xxxiv. Petkov notes in Cippico’s account both the sacking and looting of coastal cities and the use of a «scorched earth» policy in the search for booty. «Since the Venetian empire’s inception, raiding enemy coastal settlements or those of people of neutral affiliation, looting, sacking, and pillaging had been the traditional Venetian mode of warfare». On Venetian and Ottoman predation more generally, see Benjamin Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Era,” in A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797, ed. Eric Dursteler (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 198-213.


29 Ibidem.

30 Ibidem, 11. Petkov believes this settlement to be modern-day Çeşme.

31 Ibidem, 11 and xxv.
A century before Lepanto, Cippico thus celebrated the commercial gain available to Venetian commanders in a zone where the allegiances of the local populace might be transient or difficult to discern. This was not war, it was opportunity.

Mocenigo sailed for winter quarters toward Modon. And there, after a temporary diversion to Lemnos, each galley was fortified by the addition of ten armed horsemen, *stratiote*, or «mercenary riders» recruited «from every city of the Peloponnese subject to their [Venetian] dominion, or allied with them»32. According to Cippico, these were men who had «devastated the part of the Peloponnese subject to the Ottoman and turned it into a desert». He added that they were «very rapacious, more prone and better skilled to prey rather than [to] fight pitched battles»33. Mocenigo, accompanied by two Venetian legates, in the spring of 1472, then «took off to despoil and devastate the maritime provinces of Asia»34. Cippico here notes that Mocenigo did not want to inflict harm on the islands and provinces of Greece where the majority of the population was Christian, but planned to direct his attention to Asia, «a province populated by barbarian and infidel people dedicated and devoted to the superstitious sect of Muhammad»35.

The narrative continues in this vein, listing one tale of looting after another for the campaign season of 1472. Cippico makes the point that raids took place «in the deep of night». At Castro in the plain of Pergamum, the marauders «overran several villages», taking men, farm animals and household goods36. The galleys then sailed to a deserted island nearby where the booty was unloaded and divided, the mercenary horsemen keeping two-thirds of what they had seized for themselves. Proceeding to the port of Barbanicola, the «soldiers and horsemen […] disembarked and spread all over the countryside». Cippico notes that «they captured people of all ages and many sheep but little else besides some carpets and felts»37. He points out that the locals were herders with no fixed abode; they made their «tents and beds with felts»38. Carpets are mentioned again as an important booty item, as is further raiding of areas inhabited by pastoralists on the Bodrum peninsula. Apparently, it was common practice to retire to “uninhabited” islands to divide the spoils, to hunt, and to replenish water supplies39. Cippico’s division of this Mediterranean raiding space thus included island refuges and hostile coasts as well as spaces designated as Christian or infidel. Mocenigo boasted that he had: «despoiled Aeolia and Caria, rich provinces of the barbarian enemy, of men and animals, and burned them down and put everything to the sword»40. He further noted the Signoria’s preeminent role among empires in this ongoing defense

34 Ibidem.
37 Ibidem, 17. Petkov notes the area as part of southwestern Turkey.
38 Ibidem.
39 Ibidem, 22-23.
40 Ibidem, 22.
of Christendom against the Ottomans. But the theme of predation from this eyewitness account is seldom far from the narrator’s mind.

Those deriving from Ottoman spaces and zones of authority developed their own expertise in predation as illustrated by Murat Cem Mengüç’s study of an Ottoman history by Safa’i detailing the newly emergent empire’s expedition to Lepanto in 1499. Safa’i notes the gory effect of warfare: «I saw decapitated heads, used like cannon balls / I saw blood run like a river into the sea… / I saw many boats ruined because of fire [and] Those who tried to escape drowned in the sea / a thousand lives weren’t worth a straw». He writes that the sailors said that had they known what warfare was like they would never have boarded the boats. But Safa’i also details the looting and predation that took place in what Mengüç calls «zones of hostility», as Ottoman ships moved between bases and encounters. There, in the search for booty, food, and sweet water, Ottoman sailors terrorized the populations of the littoral. On the way to Coron, confronted by a storm, some boat crews tried to anchor their ships; but they were deterred when the people on shore, who were haying, set their hay on fire so that the smoke would drive off the enemy ships. The next day, near Coron, marauders from the Ottoman fleet pillaged local orchards and gardens, then killed a monk and burnt his church. The designation «zones of hostility» is a useful one for the accounts of both Cippico and Safa’i. Zones of hostility enabled zones of predation. Spots along the shores of the Mediterranean could alternate between being zones of hostility or pacificity, depending on imperial policies, the movement of fleets, and the whims of local authorities or ship commanders. When the locals set their hay on fire, they were signaling that they were not easy prey. But their action also suggests that they had experienced predation before. Even in zones of pacificity, there was no guarantee that the locals were safe. Predators came from the land and the sea; and the variable status of such Mediterranean territories meant that who was subject to which imperial entity

41 Michael Talbot, “Separating the Waters from the Sea: The Place of Islands in Ottoman Maritime Territoriality during the Eighteenth Century,” in Islands of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Antonis Hadjikyriacou (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Weiner, 2018), 78-79, makes the case for an Ottoman territoriality in a later period focusing on the mainland littoral rather than on islands or seas, «[…] temporary assertions over the sea were occasionally necessary, all with the aim of protecting the people living on the coasts of Europe, Asia, and the islands, as well as those trading or sailing in what the Ottomans considered to be their waters, more often than not centered on the coast».

42 Murat Cem Mengüç, “Maritime Warfare in the Aegean and Ionian Islands: Safa’i’s History of the 1499 Lepanto Expedition,” in Islands of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Antonis Hadjikyriacou (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2019), 89. Mengüç concludes that Safa’i was probably not an eyewitness like Cippico, but a well-connected, expert interviewer of eye-witnesses.

43 Ibidem, 90, 95. Lines in verse; author’s translation.


46 Ibidem, 98.

was a confusing prospect, causing terror and anxiety for some and providing opportunity for others. In both narratives the Mediterranean is mapped in terms of islands and coasts with careful attention given to whether resistance is likely to be present or absent. Cippico’s telling of Mediterranean space also highlights the dimension of commercial goods and their value. In any case, the predation detailed by Cippico and Safa’i sets the tone for a long 16th century of Venetian-Ottoman conflict that paved the way for Lepanto and its aftermats.

These brief cases are merely suggestive; they do not do justice to the complex and comprehensive systems of raiding that bridged the gaps between navies and piracy and tested the authority of imperial entities. Unlike these narratives, maps cannot show us the householders and herders or the spaces that were perceived to be vulnerable or impregnable. But maps are suggestive of the idea of predation in the Mediterranean world; they convey the notions of the safe and the unsafe, in part through the depiction of fortresses. By way of illustration, I will proceed to the island book of Giovanni Camocio, a text that conveys the “feel” of the Mediterranean through pictures more than through words, to look for expressions of empire, itinerary, and predation.

CAMOCIO, MAPPING THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE TIME OF LEPANTO

The isolario (or island book) of the Venetian cartographer and publisher, Giovanni Francesco Camocio, like other map compilations, was issued in varying configurations over time. It was an evolving, collaborative process, employing a range of cartographers. It is no surprise, then, that Camocio’s available assemblage of maps

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48 For a fine-grained reading of the systems of raiding in the Adriatic, their imperial implications and their political and economic factors, see Wendy Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth Century Adriatic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 89-154. Bracewell notes both the principle of terror and a local “code of behavior” on raiding that affected Uskoks activities.

49 Giovanni Botero, *Delle Relationi Universalii, Prima parte* (Rome: Apresso Giorgio Ferrari, 1591), 83, described Dalmatia in terms of city fortresses, strong, like Zara, or weak, like Split, “povere e mal abitare” as a result of Ottoman raids. He divided the Mediterranean spaces into those shores of the sea controlled by the Ottomans and those expansive borders, by land and sea, contested by Venetians and the “Turk” (Botero, *Delle Relationi*, 219, 232). He added that the Venetians maintained their position vis-à-vis the Ottomans, “more through the art of peace than of wars”. He also counts the Mediterranean spaces in terms of the itinerary of islands, how one would encounter them sailing along the coast (Botero, *Delle Relationi*, 249-250).


51 See Miljenko Lapaine and Ivka Kljajić, “Some Important Persons in Croatian Cartography,” in *Pet stoljeća geografskih i pomorskih karata Hrvatske / Five Centuries of Maps and Charts of Croatia*, eds. Drago Novak, Miljenko Lapaine, and Dubravka Minarić (Zagreb: školska knjiga, 2005), 121-22, which notes
of the Mediterranean was updated to incorporate maps depicting the setting and staging of the Battle of Lepanto. Lepanto was a placeholder, or marker, for the spatial imaginary of the Mediterranean. It focused the reader’s attention on its location at the center of an imperial struggle for territory and prestige.

The question I wish to address here is not the question of provenance, who produced, copied or was influenced by whom, in the production of the maps for Camocio’s isolario. Rather it is the question of how consumers, Camocio’s audiences, might have seen (or been made to see) the Mediterranean through the Isole famose. How did it reflect or alter their knowledge-picture of the Mediterranean? The episode of Lepanto coincided precisely with the dramatic flourishing, or highpoint, of Venetian map production. David Woodward argues that it was at this moment that maps became «everyday commodities»; they:

[…] played a subtle but important role in shaping ideas about strange places and events. The world maps magically captured the world as a single, universal, ordered image and caught the merchant’s eye in sponsoring new trading enterprises. As a source of topical and informal information, the siege and battle maps supplied the general public with information about current events with staggering immediacy, longevity, and durability. Over 140 separate representations of the siege of Malta [for example] appeared from 1565 for the next eighty years.

Isolarii, even though they were called “island books,” covered lands and coasts as well, and incorporated the news maps, often battle scenes, noted by Woodward above, although for many Venetians, the places depicted can hardly be characterized as “strange”. Camocio’s title, after all, speaks of «famous» islands, ports, and maritime territories. Camocio himself apparently shared with Cippico some direct knowledge of Croatian segments of the Adriatic conflict zone. Over the years, island books might appear with greater or lesser amounts of text (beyond the map legends) to provide context. Camocio’s isolario was a simple affair, comprising maps without accompanying texts. The isolario of Giuseppe Rosaccio, Viaggio da Venezia a Costantinopol, published in Venice in 1599, which included or adapted many of the maps from Camocio’ work, took instead the form of an itinerary (to the ‘Holy Land’ and Istanbul) with a narrative of the journey accompanying the map illustrations. A century later, the cartographer

that the Croatian State Archive copy of Camocio’s isolario contains 88 numbered sheets while the National and University Library of Zagreb copy includes 78 unnumbered sheets, «with slight differences in the content and sequence». Eleven sheets, the authors note, bear Camocio’s name. Anica Kistić, “The Origins of Camocio’s and Rosaccio’s Isolario in Croatian Collections,” in Pet stoljeća geografskih, 293, who has consulted multiple copies, argues that the “original” Camocio isolario had 88 numbered pages. Stouraiti, “Talk, script and print,” 228, calls isolarii «significant cultural agents, which familiarized Venetian readers with the land and seascapes of the Levant».


Giuseppe Rosaccio, Viaggio da Venezia a Costantinopol, introduction by Francesco Boni de Nobili (Venice: Dario Bastiani, 2017). The Newberry Library version of Camocio follows more of an itinerary arrangement, matching Rosaccio’s itinerary especially in the first half. A contemporary narrative telling
Models of Mediterranean, Camocio’s Isolario…

and publisher, Vincenzo Coronelli, also in Venice, would describe part one of his much more elaborate island book, in a note to his readers, as a set of 138 islands that form «the famous Emporium of Venice»56. Coronelli thus shared a vision of the islands as beginning with a great zone of exchange that flowed into and out of the Mediterranean. Simple or complex, each one of these isolarii expressed a set of zones of proximity and possession. Each one suggested the impetus to commerce, travel, and war.

Camocio’s Isole famose was decidedly framed in terms of the conflict between the imperial powers of Venice and the Ottoman state. Its undated title page states this clearly: Famous islands, fortresses, and maritime territories subject to the Most Serene Signoria of Venice and to other Christian princes, and to Signor Turk, newly illuminated. Beneath this formal title are two vignettes, one of armies and one of navies clashing57. The select map illustrations provided in this essay are from the copy of Isole famose found at the Newberry Library in Chicago (with 46 maps); but my analysis below derives from the more expansive copy found in the Aikaterini Laskeridis Foundation Library, Travelogues—Travelers’ Views version (with 77 maps), which is accessible online to readers who want to call up more of the images58.

The very first map in the Laskeridis Foundation Library edition is the walled fortress of Vienna, hardly a maritime territory but emblematic of European Christendom’s struggle to limit the expansionist ambitions of the Ottomans59. Later on, the besieged fortress of Sighetvar, Hungary (Map 62) is depicted, the site of the demise of Sultan Suleiman in 156660. So too, the Isole famose contains an image of a «Divine Apparition» appearing over two mosques in Istanbul, understood as a symbol of impending Christian victory against the Ottomans (Map 16)61.

Scattered throughout the remaining maps are images of the Ottoman-Venetian competition to hold port cities and their surrounding hinterlands. These are not ranged

of a 1587 journey is Giovanni Alcarotti, Del viaggio de terra santa (Novaro: apresso gli Heredi di Fr. Sefalli, 1596), 3-19.


57 Library collections have labelled the editions employed here variously as being published between 1572 and 1574. For an image of the title page, see Kisić, “The Origins of Camocio’s and Rosaccio’s Isolario,” 292.


59 The first map in the Newberry Library edition is a map of Europe, northern Africa, and part of Asia by Domenico Zenoi, dated 1568. It is an abbreviated version of the same map in Aikaterini Laskeridis Foundation Library: Camocio, Isole famose, Map 66, which expands to include the rest of Africa and part of North America.

60 This is the very last map in the New York Public Library version which has 87 maps and begins with the map of Europe, Africa, and part of Asia that is the 66th map in the version employed here.

61 Brummett, Mapping the Ottomans, 115-119,
in itinerary form, from Venice to Istanbul, as are the maps in Rosaccio’s Viaggio. Indeed, while the map of the Italian Peninsula and Venice is placed second, the map of the city of Istanbul is located in the sixth position. Otherwise, most of the maps do depict the Mediterranean territories between the Signoria and the Porte. Beyond these, the isolario includes one image of the fortress of Valetta on Malta (Map 32); two images of Tunis fortress (Maps 7 and 60); and two rather portolan-style images of continents, one of the port-dotted coasts of the Archipelago, western Anatolia, and a segment of North Africa (Map 55), and the other of Europe, Africa, and part of Asia (Map 66). These suggest the western reach of Ottoman sovereignty, and the broader Mediterranean and world contexts of the conflict. There are five images directly specific to the Battle of Lepanto: massed ships engaged in battle for the «amazing» victory of Lepanto (Map 5); «the true order of the two potent armadas, Christian and Turk» (Map 23); the Gulf of Lepanto, site of the battle (Map 42); «the true order of the navy of the Holy League» (Map 61); and a depiction of the standard of the «Pasha General of the Turkish armada» (Map 64).62 These have received a certain amount of attention, especially given the celebratory mood the battle conjured in the literatures of Venice and the Christian kingdoms. But Lepanto was only one highlight in the parade of Mediterranean spaces; the major theme of Camocio’s isolario was the coastal-island zones and, in particular, the port fortresses where both commerce and conflict were concentrated. For these spaces the isolario communicated the layers of history and possession and used the Battle of Lepanto to produce a new knowledge picture for Camocio’s readers, one that was a function of previous knowledge pictures replicating themselves with greater or lesser sensitivity to the acquisition of new information63.

Taken as a whole, the isolario is not simply conflict oriented. Indeed, the number of non-conflict maps is greater than those showing combat or militant forces. If we exclude the images of the pasha’s standard and the divine apparition, fifty-four of the remaining seventy-five maps are pacific. That is, they do not depict troops or combat.64 That disparity reminds us that combat was only one theme in the visualization of Mediterranean space. Setting aside the frame of combat or tranquility, twenty-one maps depict islands: thirteen untethered and floating in the sea, and eight depicted in relation to their surrounding coasts.65 Two more, as noted above, depict continents. Three show fleets aligned or in combat in the sea. Five show regions (Italian Peninsula, Albania, Morea, Greece/Archipelago, Istria). Three show gulfs (Prevesa, Lepanto, and Ludrin). The remaining maps show fortresses: 30 port (city) fortresses, 3 with more than one fortress arrayed along the coast, and 8 of inland (city)

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63 Ian Manners, European Cartographers and the Ottoman World 1500-1750: Maps from the Collection of O.J. Sopranos (Chicago: Oriental Institute Museum, 2007), 36, notes «the persistence of geographic information once it had found its way onto the map».
64 Two views of Kilitbahar fortress, one from the sea and one from the land side, suggest smoke emerging from cannon on the fortress walls; but there are no objects of this fire.
65 Nicolas Vatin, “Îles grecques? Îles ottomans? L’insertions des îles de l’Égée dans l’Empire ottoman à la fin du XVIe siècle,” in Insularités ottomanes, eds. Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Institut français d’Études anatoliennes, Maisonneuve & Larose, 2004), 72, 82-87, illustrates the significance of coastal proximity as well as the ambiguities of exercising imperial authority in the islands in the last quarter of the sixteenth century.
fortresses. Camocio’s maps of islands in the context of their mainland coasts remind us of the “geographies of exchange” that Julia Clancy-Smith has examined in assessing the role of islands as intermediaries.

The port-fortress might occur on the mainland or on an island. In either case it was the site of commerce, communication, combat, and competition, a site that the audience was presumed to know or have heard of. It was a stopping place on a journey, with walls to provide safety. Those walls, an edifice of habitation, occupation, and protection were also an easy marker of imperial possession on the map, even if possession and identity outside the walls were contested, changeable, or difficult to predict. Port-fortresses ‘belonged’ to one power or another, and that possession was often enough inscribed on the map, although the legend might also indicate recent changes of possession. Maps of broader territories (e.g., coasts or provinces) might provide symbols of alternating possession, a cross here, a crescent there.

One such example, in the parade of Mediterranean spaces that Camocio’s Isolario presented to its readers, was the province of Albania (Map 11, Laskeridis). This map shows the coasts and hinterlands surrounding the gulfs of Lodrin and Valona, with the anchor ports of Dolcigno, Durazzo, and Valona. The bulk of this province is shown as “owned” by the Ottomans, that ownership indicated by crescents on towns and Ottoman troops marching in the countryside. On the Dolcigno side of the territory, however, the fortress is marked by the winged lion flag of Venice, and churches are topped with crosses. Three galleys in the sea sport banners with crosses. This division of space, nonetheless, is not absolute. On the Ottoman “side” of the map, two churches, Santa Maria, and San Nicholo, are both marked with crosses. That marking can signify the weight of past identities, the ambiguity of imperial sovereignty, or the vagaries of marking possession on map plates. In any case, the map suggests, rather than depicts, the sovereign struggle for Mediterranean space. Also, on this map one sees a device that is common enough on such maps, several small groups of armed riders outside the settlements and detached from the massed marching units. While this can be construed as a decorative device, a pictorial representation of travelers, or simply another option for depicting military struggle, it also reminds us of Cippico’s armed marauders, men with the capability of preying on the countryside who might or might not be part of a formal military unit.

66 Of the inland fortresses, Scutari (Map 33), on a lake, is shown in relation to the coast.
70 In general, I am using the place names employed on the maps in Camocio’s Isolario.
71 It is important to note here that not all settlements or banners have markers of identity; and sometimes when banners are marked, they are illegible. Note too, that the crescent is an identity marker chosen by the artists of the Christian kingdoms to represent the Ottomans. The crescent was not a primary marker for Ottoman self-identity.
Another map zeroes in on the fortress of Valona itself (Map 73, Laskeridis). It is surrounded by the residences of the town, gardens outside of town, and then isolated buildings and a more distant fortress in the surrounding hills (Fig. 2). This is the type of hinterland one can imagine being raided in the narratives of Cippico and Safa’i. The legend box is blank as is the case with various of the maps in this collection. But sovereign identity is still stamped on the map with a crescent on Valona fortress and galleys bearing flags with crosses in the port. There is no evidence of direct conflict.
Then there are the islands themselves. The fact that this is a Mediterranean space is clearly marked on the map of Candia (Map 67, Laskeridis), with «Mare del Mediterraneo» inscribed in the sea on one side of the island and «Mare del Archipelago» on the other (Fig. 3). The city fortress of Candia lies mid coast on the left side of the island. The legend box highlights location, antiquities, produce, and possession:

Candia in Crete, island located in the Mediterranean sea, [a] place of the Most Illustrious Signori Veneziani, full of distinguished antiquities. It is an island fertile in every way and especially noted for a unique wine. It is 260 miles (mill.) long, 50 miles wide and 520 all around (di circuito). It is 500 miles from the Cape of Otranto, from Alexandria 450, 660 miles from Syria, and 250 from Africa.73

72 Newberry Library, Basiles folio. oG 1955.C3 [1572]: Camocio, Isole famose, Map 30. This map can be contrasted with the map of Corfu (Newberry Library, Basiles folio. oG 1955 .C3 [1572]: Camocio, Isole famose, Map 21, also Aikaterini Laskeridis Foundation Library: “Travelogues-Travellers’ Views,” Map 44, another «most fertile» island, which appears juxtaposed to the shore of «Epiro Provincia», seemingly only a stone’s throw away, but noted in the legend as 20 miles away.
73 Ibidem. For comparison, Coronelli, Isolario [Dell’ Atalante Veneto], unnumbered: map located after p. 167 depicted Corfu in a two-page image surrounded by vignettes of various fortresses on the island.
This is a pacific map, one that suggests commerce, given Crete’s desirable wine and the ships sailing around the coasts. There are crosses on several of the galleys, but they do not disrupt the sense of prosperity and relative distance.

Fig. 3 - Candia on Crete. Giovanni Camocio, Isole famose, Map 30. Chicago, Newberry Library, Vault, Baskes G1955.C3 [1574]

But imperial identity was still important. The legend box reads «island of Corfu possessed by the Most Serene Republic of Venice», followed by Coronelli as author and a dedication.
Not so pacific is Camocio’s map of Cyprus, which appears, as in other contemporary maps of the island, juxtaposed to the coasts of Anatolia and Syria (Map 45, Laskeridis). Cyprus was a stepping-stone in the itinerary to and from the Levant, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. Goods and people flowed in and out of its cities, especially Famagosta. As if to suggest this interchange, the surrounding sea is full of various types of ship (Fig. 4). But the Anatolian shore is studded with multiple units of marching troops carrying crescent flags, all moving in the direction of the coast, as if to suggest Ottoman aggression. The caption reads:

The most noble island of Cyprus, whose greatness excels all the others, and called Blessed for its miraculous fertility with wine, grain, oil, flax, babagio (?), woolens, timber, garments, salt, fish, metals. It is divided into two (ij) districts (contadi), 550 miles around. It is 110 miles long and 65 miles wide. It is distant from Syria 60 miles, from Caramania [on the Anatolian coast] 50, from Candia 500 miles. The principal city of government is Nicosia [inland], which is 38 miles distant from Famagosta [on the coast].

Here again, the island’s distance from other Mediterranean spaces, its reachability (how long it might take to get to it or from it to elsewhere) is important. So too, is the value of its goods to the sovereigns, merchants, and predators who sought them.

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74 Newberry Library, Basiles folio. oG 1955 .C3 [1572]: Camocio, Isole famose, Map 43. A similar juxtaposition with a different orientation and without the marching troops may be found in Paolo Forlani’s 1570 map of Cyprus, see David Woodward, The Maps and Prints of Paolo Forlani: A Descriptive Bibliography (Chicago: Newberry Library, 1990), Fig. 88, p. 50.
A different and very common type of image is that of the coastal fortress besieged. One such map shows Scardona (Map 56, Laskeridis), a well-inland yet coastal fortress that is reachable by river (the Krka) from Sebenico in Croatia, thus suggesting
the inland flows of both Mediterranean spaces and the Ottoman-Venetian conflict (Fig. 5). There is a ruined fortress and the hills of the hinterland in the background. In the foreground, Venetian ships (marked by winged lion flags) are actively firing on the town while men on horseback and on foot skirmish around the city walls. Crescents mark the mosque and the fortress walls. The legend reads: «Scardona, an ancient city in Dalmatia, located on the Proclilian Lake [Lake Prokljan], an Ottoman (Turco) territory near Sebenico, newly taken and demolished [spianato] by the Most Illustrious Signoria of Venice» 75. This map reinforces the notion of Venetian successes, push-back against Ottoman advances, and penetration into the “Turk” countryside. Scardona’s territorial context is not visible in the map frame. The map’s vision of Mediterranean realities is contingent upon the knowledge picture of the reader. But, regardless of that understanding, its message, like that of the Battle of Lepanto maps, is one of Venetian victory.

Fig. 5 - Scardona. Camocio, Isole famose, Map 7. Chicago, Newberry Library, Vault, Baskes G1955.C3 [1574].

A wider view is presented in a map of Modon, not shown here. The city is embedded in its wider coastal setting, with Sapientia Island to the south and west, and the fortress of Navarino to the north along the coast. Gardens surround the outskirts of the city. Galleys (labelled «armada Turchesca») crowd the port and stretch out along the coast. More galleys (labelled «armada Christiana») are packed into a gulf on nearby Sapientia. Around Navarino, a pitched battle seems to be taking place, two more contingents of troops are marching toward the coast from the east, and more ships fill the attendant Gulf of Órmos. The legend tells the reader why this stretch of coast is important and what is going on: «The true picture of the site of Modone and Navarino in the province of the Morea, where at present one finds the armada of the Turk besieged by the Christian armada of the Sacred League, with hope of victory. In Venice, 1572». While the legend focuses on naval action, the scene highlights the fleets sheltering in place, a good reminder of the common disjunction between message, image, and event. This image, focusing apparently on events of spring 1572, constitutes one of the “update” maps added to Camocio’s collection in the aftermath of Lepanto. The Newberry edition of Isole famose does not include this map, presenting instead Modon as a tranquil Ottoman port, «at present in possession of the infidels».

Battle, after all, as both Cippico and Safa’i suggested, was an occasional event. It is no accident that many of Camocio’s maps depict land and seascapes where battle, or even sovereignty, is not the preeminent theme. So, I conclude with two of the Isola famose’s more pacific images of segments of the Mediterranean. The first is the Gulf of Prevesa (Map 10, Laskeridis), one of the maps that is stamped with Camocio’s name («Appresso Giovan. Francesco Camocio, con Privilegio»). The second is the Gulf of Lepanto (Map 42, Laskeridis), also one of Camocio’s own. Both locations were the sites of famous battles, Prevesa in 1538 (an Ottoman victory) and Lepanto in 1571 (a victory for the coalition of the Christian kingdoms). Thus, the mere inscribing of those names on the map for a Venetian audience invoked the competition of Signoria and Porte. That said, these were spaces known for things besides naval conflict, part of the maritime parade of stopping places for ships and humans as they moved through the Mediterranean pathways. The Gulf of Prevesa provides a dramatic juxtaposition of the «Mare Mediterraneo» to one side and the hill-dotted terrain of the land (Fig. 6). Surrounded by those hills is the gulf, full of galleys whose banners are either unmarked or illegible. The land is also marked by maritime fortresses (Santa Maura, Prevesa, Arta) topped by crescents revealing Ottoman possession. What is most apparent here is that the gulf shelters ships; it is, at least in this frame, a haven from the dangers of the sea.

76 Aikaterini Laskeridis Foundation Library: Camocio, Isola famose, Map 37.
77 Newberry Library, Basiles folio. oG 1955 .C3 [1572]: Camocio, Isola famose, Map 27, shows only the port city of Modon, with crescent towers and ships sailing in the harbor. It is signed «D. Zenoni».
78 Ibidem, Map 22.
79 Ibidem, Map 25.
The map of the Gulf of Lepanto also appears pacific in the Laskeridis Foundation Library version, not shown here. The gulf is a large thumb of sea poking into the mainland. It divides one province from another and is an inlet from a sea that features an island-dotted coastline and more islands opposite the mainland. Lepanto and Patrasso port fortresses overlook the sea while smaller fortifications labelled «Dardinello» and «Dardanello» guard the entrance to the gulf on either side, each one marked with a crescent. Various towns appear both along the coasts and inland. But this map presents a different message than that of the map of Prevesa. That message is not supplied with firing galleys or units of marching troops. Instead, it is the legend that tells the reader what he or she is seeing, a vision that invokes the past as the map of Prevesa did not:

Gentle Readers. Here you are shown the site of the Gulf of Lepanto, in antiquity called Naupato. It is more than 60 miles long, and it is 30 miles wide near Eximili and 20 near Lepanto. And here is also depicted for you the site of the place where on October 7, 1571, by means of the Armada of the Holy League, our Lord Jesus

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Fig. 6 - Gulf of Prevesa. Giovanni Camocio, *Isole famose*, Map 22. Chicago, Newberry Library, Vault, Baskes G1955.C3 [1574].

Christ wanted to come to the aid of his people. In Venice, *Appresso Giov. Francesco Campotio*.

A small legend box outside the gulf marks the spot, reading: «In this place occurred the glorious day of the Christians, against the grand dragon, in praise of blessed Jesus». This gulf, then is a place that recent history has transformed, almost gently it seems for the «Gentle Readers». The sovereigns supplied the armada; but it was God who provided the victory over the Muslim foe.

It is notable that the Newberry Library edition of the *Isola famose* does not include this map. Rather, the map of Lepanto, signed «D. Zenoni» (Domenico Zenoi, fl. 1560-1580), shows an abbreviated version of the gulf with significantly less surrounding territory (Fig. 7). The scene is pacific, with unidentified galleys sailing in the sea and the fortresses of Lepanto and Patrasso topped with crescents. The legend tells no tale of navies, supplicant peoples, and divine intervention. It reads: «The city of Lepanto, situated in the province of Achaia, with its gulf, and the city of Patrasso, situated in the Morea, at present in the possession of the infidels». The Gulf of Lepanto is thus a place in a province, «theirs» not «ours» and devoid of glorious histories. This variance in map depictions of the Gulf of Lepanto may suggest the Laskeridis edition was put together somewhat later than that at the Newberry; or it may simply reflect a more limited set of selections for a less affluent buyer. But the juxtaposition of both versions of the Gulf reminds us that Lepanto was above all a place, a shelter in what Coronelli later called «the famous emporium of Venice». It was also the site of a famous sea battle, but that was a transitory part of its identity, even for the most interested of parties. The description in Piri Reis’s (1465-1553) famous, *Book of the Sea*, for example, makes the point. The Gulf of Lepanto/İnebahtı was marked by: two fortresses at the mouth, «built by the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II» (r. 1481-1512); the big castle of İnebahtı with its artificial harbor; and a more expansive harbor, Espire İspisi, at the eastern end of the gulf «where we quartered our warships when İnebahtı was conquered […]. This is a fine haven, safe against all winds. It was here that our victorious troops dug wells for their drinking water»81.

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81 Piri Reis, *Kitab-i Bahriye*, ed. Ertuğrul Zekâi Ökte (İstanbul: Historical Research Foundation, 1988), 675-77, 680-81. The mentioning of access to sweet water, always a critical factor in the movement of ships, is a key reason that Tom Goodrich argued (personal communication) for the practical utility, rather than simply decorative value, of the maps in the *Kitab-i Bahriye*. See also, Svat Soucek, *Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus: The Khalili Portolan Atlas* (London: Nour Foundation, 1992), 84-91. Soucek sees the *isolarii* as part of the inspiration for Piri Reis’ work (Soucek, *Piri Reis*, 84).
In sum, the vision of the Mediterranean presented in Camocio’s *Isolario*, is that of a range of fortresses, mostly in port or coastal spaces, sometimes enmeshed in conflict and sometimes not. Other maps show the spaces, especially gulfs, where ships can shelter, rather than highlighting the fortresses themselves. That range of maritime spaces is interrupted by reminders of the victory at Lepanto and by the occasional image of an inland fortress. At times the map is marked with a clear designation of *Mare Mediterraneo* but mostly that is taken for granted. Here, the model of imperial possession seems to take precedence. While the itinerary can be imagined, it is not foregrounded (as it is by Rosaccio or Piri Reis). As for the predator, Camocio’s maps show nothing like the raiding activities suggested by Cippico and Safa’i. But they do show ships aligned before ports, firing upon fortresses. Sometimes they suggest the people and settlements in the countryside. And various of them include images of men marching on the land to indicate a state of conflict in the pictured territories. These are iconic figures (often generic) and found on many maps. One ordinarily (and rightly) sees these men as troops, an indication of warfare. But we can also read them as a more general indicator of conflict and could easily see them as suggesting the type of marauders that Cippico treats in his history of Mocenigo. They are men sent by an
enemy; they may meet the formal description of an “army”, or they might be something less identifiable, armed men intent on various forms of predation.

AN OTTOMAN MEDITERRANEAN?

Much has been written on the Mediterranean since Braudel wrote his masterpiece. During my career, like many others, I have taken a number of runs at modelling the Mediterranean; but conversations and readings never fail to expand and challenge those attempts. Then, there is the question that all of us who work with ships and merchants and empires must face: whether there was an Ottoman Mediterranean. When I was completing my dissertation on the Ottomans, Venetians, and the Levantine Mediterranean, I thought I had an answer to that question. Yes, there was an Ottoman Mediterranean; at least the Ottomans “had” the White Sea as much as any other imperial polity had it. They were actual and important contenders and operators. But, as my career has progressed, I find myself rather less determined that there was an Ottoman Sea, or any imperial sea. The more one consumes the showings and tellings of the Mediterranean, the more one sees the Mediterranean as avoiding possession and functioning as a terrible transimperial force. It was a place where men and ships went to die, where goods and fortunes were lost as easily as they were made, where exalted imperial plans often foundered. It was a sea of edges loaded with ports and afflicted with predators. Its maps could be stamped with emblems and imperial designations; but mapping always had as much to do with the desired and imagined as with the confronted and the “real”. Narratives of the Mediterranean focused on travails and various forms of relief at least as much as on triumphs. Maps pictured the conflicts but longed for the commerce-boosting periods of tranquility. The vision of the sea had, perhaps, more to do with how often the predators were avoided, how often the ships slipped through, how often the traveler could pursue his itinerary and make it to the next destination.

83 Of course, as Clancy-Smith, “The Mediterranean of the Barbary Coast,” 49-51, has pointed out, foundered ships often meant windfalls for those on the shore.
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Recibido: 27 de agosto de 2022
Aceptado: 22 de mayo de 2023