Transforming into a physician: discontinuity narratives and autobiographical arguments
Keywords:
Narrative identity, persistence problem, transformation, discontinuity, autobiographical argumentsCopyright (c) 2021 Marcia Villanueva Lozano
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
This paper presents an account on
the persistence problem from a narrative perspective to describe what I call the
transformation problem. The analysis is
based on medical students’ and professionals’ experiences regarding how it was
for them “transforming into a physician”.
By using these empirical data, this paper
explores the discontinuity narratives and
the autobiographical arguments used to
repair such discontinuity.
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