Keywords:
minimal self, phenomenology, identity theories, personality, old ageCopyright (c) 2021 Agata Joanna B?k
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
This paper focuses on the relevance that
the notion of minimal self, as proposed e.g.
by Zahavi, for a phenomenological theory of
identity. I will do so by analyzing the phenomenon
of coming of age. Firstly, I characterize
the notion of minimal self as expressed in Zahavi’s
claims with a view to analyzing premises
and arguments on which it is grounded.
Nevertheless, secondly, defending minimal
self might pose challenges when it comes to
characterize certain life experiences that seem
to be constituted intersubjectively. In particular,
phenomena such as illness, age or gender
are not exclusively constituted in individual,
solitary experience, but rather they can only
be ultimately understood by the very subject
in intersubjective perspective. The argument I
offer in the third step of my exposition, is the
description of advanced age in terms of personal
discovery of being old, drawing mainly on
Simone de Beauvoir’s writings.
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