No. 10 (2015)
I. Filosofía moral, política y del derecho

The Role of Social Heuristics in Reasoning

María G. Navarro
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
Portada del número 10 de Bajo Palabra
Published September 18, 2015

Keywords:

heuristics, deliberation, enclave deliberation, strategic learning, folk psychology
How to Cite
Navarro, M. G. (2015). The Role of Social Heuristics in Reasoning. Bajo Palabra, (10), 123–134. https://doi.org/10.15366/bp2015.10.009

Abstract

This article explains the connection between social heuristics and deliberative reasoning. Instead of characterizing heuristics according to disciplines or fields, here they are located in our deliberative enclaves. The author argues that the use of social heuristics guides both the flow of information as well as participation in the different deliberative phases; by analyzing heuristics, we establish indicators that measure levels of deliberation. This hypothesis leads to a pluralistic view of the social function of heuristics, understood as a toolbox affording new social utilities. It then becomes necessary to integrate this type of reasoning with a wider plan of action that explains in what sense heuristics are measures that produce knowledge, as opposed to knowledge that is already produced.

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