Núm. 28 (2021): Sujetos, personas e individuos: estudios sobre la individualidad
Artículos

Bosquejo de un sujeto mínimo neuroafectivo

Asier Arias Domínguez
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Publicado enero 1, 2022

Palabras clave:

sujeto, conciencia, neurociencias, emoción, mente
Cómo citar
Arias Domínguez, A. . (2022). Bosquejo de un sujeto mínimo neuroafectivo. Bajo Palabra, (28), 61–79. https://doi.org/10.15366/bp2021.28.003

Resumen

La conciencia y el yo acaparan un número creciente de páginas en las revistas
de neurociencias. No existe, sin embargo, acuerdo acerca del modo apropiado
de articular la intersección entre ambas
nociones. En este artículo nos aproximamos a las posibilidades abiertas al efecto en el área de la neurociencia afectiva,
constatando que los enredos conceptuales presentes en la literatura no impiden
partir de la base empírica y teórica de
la disciplina hacia la elaboración de un
marco conceptual adecuado para el tratamiento de la señalada intersección.

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