Palabras clave:
sujeto, conciencia, neurociencias, emoción, menteDerechos de autor 2021 Asier Arias Domínguez
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
Resumen
La conciencia y el yo acaparan un número creciente de páginas en las revistas
de neurociencias. No existe, sin embargo, acuerdo acerca del modo apropiado
de articular la intersección entre ambas
nociones. En este artículo nos aproximamos a las posibilidades abiertas al efecto en el área de la neurociencia afectiva,
constatando que los enredos conceptuales presentes en la literatura no impiden
partir de la base empírica y teórica de
la disciplina hacia la elaboración de un
marco conceptual adecuado para el tratamiento de la señalada intersección.
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