Núm. 28 (2021): Sujetos, personas e individuos: estudios sobre la individualidad
Artículos

The Physical, the Subjective, and the Social in the Debate on Personal Identity: A Critical and Historical Overview of Neo-Lockean Accounts: Lo físico, lo subjetivo y lo social en el debate sobre la identidad personal: Una visión crítica e histórica de las teorías neolockeanas

Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
Publicado enero 1, 2022

Palabras clave:

Identidad personal, teorías neolockeanas, historia, narrativismo, Personal identity, neo-Lockean theories, History, Narrativism
Cómo citar
Muñoz-Corcuera, A. . (2022). The Physical, the Subjective, and the Social in the Debate on Personal Identity: A Critical and Historical Overview of Neo-Lockean Accounts: Lo físico, lo subjetivo y lo social en el debate sobre la identidad personal: Una visión crítica e histórica de las teorías neolockeanas. Bajo Palabra, (28), 21–45. https://doi.org/10.15366/bp2021.28.001 (Original work published 27 de diciembre de 2021)

Resumen

Existen al menos tres dimensiones
fundamentales en aquello que todos nosotros somos: una dimensión física, una
mental y otra social. En este artículo me
centraré en cómo, en la historia del debate sobre la identidad personal desde una
postura neo-lockeana, se ha tratado de
dar cuenta de las tres dimensiones. El objetivo será demostrar que la única teoría
neolockeana que ha sido capaz de hacerlo
es lo que denomino la Nueva Perspectiva Narrativa, caracterizada por establecer
una distinción entre tres entidades que
somos: seres humanos, yoes y personas.

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