Aulus Gellius and the semantic analysis of possibilities // Aulo Gelio y el análisis semántico de posibilidades
Resumen
Resumen
La teoría de los modelos mentales establece que el pensamiento humano es principalmente semántico y que consiste en análisis de las posibilidades a las que las sentencias hacen referencia. La teoría tiene un gran apoyo empírico. No obstante, se puede pensar que, si realmente muestra cómo la mente humana opera, debería ser posible hallar textos antiguos escritos por filósofos o lógicos cuyos argumentos revelen identificaciones y comparaciones de posibilidades semánticas. En este trabajo, trato de argumentar que, efectivamente, se pueden encontrar textos de este tipo en las fuentes antiguas. En concreto, comento un fragmento de Aulo Gelio en el que está claro que se realiza un análisis de posibilidades.
Palabras clave: modelos mentales, posibilidades, razonamiento, semántica
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