

*The Slovenian School, Contributions
and Current Debates: An Exploration
from a Latin American Perspective*

*La Escuela Eslovena, Aportes y Debates Actuales:
Una Exploración desde una Perspectiva Latinoamericana*

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Resumen

Tras una breve reflexión sobre las características de la historiografía del psicoanálisis de las últimas décadas, este artículo se propone mostrar ciertos dilemas y/o debates que atraviesan el campo psicoanalítico tanto en la región como en el mundo contemporáneo. Para ello, se colocará el foco en la campaña organizada por Nina Krajnik a favor de la clínica psicoanalítica y contra el psicoanálisis teórico de Slavoj Žižek, Alenka Zupančič y Mladen Dolar. Interesa especialmente examinar cómo los argumentos de Krajnik se insertan en un proyecto más amplio que apunta tanto a una expansión de la Asociación Mundial de Psicoanálisis (AMP) encabezada por Jacques-Alain Miller, como a obtener un monopolio sobre la teoría psicoanalítica y sus efectos políticos. Se mostrará que es posible hallar las primeras manifestaciones de este proceso en América Latina ya desde tiempos anteriores al proyecto de la AMP. En este sentido, a partir de las producciones de Dolar, Zupancic y Žižek, se mostrarán algunos aportes actuales de la escuela eslovena, que se retoman aquí a la luz de contexto latinoamericano, buscando iluminar las implicaciones teóricas, institucionales, políticas, ideológicas y culturales de la dominación y la hegemonía de la corriente milleriana en el terreno psicoanalítico. Esta lógica de poder, como se verá, no ha impedido el surgimiento y el desarrollo de algunas planteos radicales e irreverentes que, no obstante, parecen haber fracasado: en algunos países latinoamericanos, como Argentina, el psicoanálisis milleriano logró imponerse incluso con mayor intensidad que en la propia Francia. Esto plantea un reto y un dilema dignos de considerar y que es preciso asumir.

Palabras Claves: Slavoj Žižek; Filosofía; Psicoanálisis; Escuela Eslovena.

Abstract

After a brief reflection on the characteristics of the historiography of psychoanalysis in recent decades, this article aims to show certain dilemmas and/or debates that cross the psychoanalytic field both in the region and in the contemporary world. To this end, the focus will be placed on the campaign organized by Nina Krajnik in favor of the psychoanalytic clinic and against the theoretical psychoanalysis of Slavoj Žižek, Alenka Zupancič and Mladen Dolar. It is of particular interest to examine how Krajnik's arguments are embedded in a broader project aiming both at an expansion of the World Association of Psychoanalysis (WAP) headed by Jacques-Alain Miller, and at obtaining a monopoly over psychoanalytic theory and its political effects. It will be shown that it is possible to find the first manifestations of this process in Latin America even before the WAP project. In this sense, based on the productions of Dolar, Zupancic and Žižek, some current contributions of the Slovenian school will be shown, which are taken up here in the light of the Latin American context, seeking to illuminate the theoretical, institutional, political, ideological and cultural implications of the domination and hegemony of the Millerian current in the psychoanalytic field. This logic of power, as will be seen, has not prevented the emergence and development of some radical and irreverent approaches which, nevertheless, seem to have failed: in some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Millerian psychoanalysis managed to impose itself even more intensely than in France itself. This poses a challenge and a dilemma worthy of consideration and which must be taken up.

Keywords: Slavoj Žižek; Philosophy; Psychoanalysis; Slovenian School.

Introduction

“Man alone is a triumphant error who makes his aberration the law of the world”

LOUIS ALTHUSSER

The 21st century remains abysmally marked by transcendent issues fostered by the academic, political, institutional, economic, social and/or cultural structures and environments of our time. Some enigmas that wander in the coordinates of our time have their origin in the 19th century... Others come from further back.

Within the framework of this work, it is relevant to mention the contributions of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), founder of what he himself called in 1914 as a psychoanalytic “movement” (*Bewegung*). Psychoanalysis is recognized in four main areas of application that gradually appeared after the search for the etiology of neurosis: a theory of the functioning of the human mind, a method and device of psychic treatment, a research method and a useful tool to analyze social, political, cultural dilemmas. The wide variety of uses that this knowledge maintains at present and from an early date makes it impossible to delimit the field clearly and definitively.^{1,2,3,4}

¹ To learn more about Freud, it is suggested to review any of his biographies, such as *La vida y Obra de Sigmund Freud* by Ernest Jones (1997), *Sigmund Freud Biografía: La vida trágica* by Raymond de Becker (1999) and *Freud: En su tiempo y en el nuestro* by Elisabeth Roudinesco (2015). In his work with hysterical patients, Freud learned and identified that neurotic symptoms were messages carrying repressed and unconscious psychic contents. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (1984, 1985) has done a historical reconstruction work and has published Freud's correspondence to W. Fliess from 1887 to 1904, offering us glimpses of what would later be a sophisticated and evidence-based theory.

² Although the movement owes its origin to science, it is necessary to clarify that it does not respond to a mere scientific discourse because it addresses and is interested in everything understood from “subjectivity”.

³ For example, in the late 1910s, Sigmund Freud showed an affinity with the social democratic project of Red Vienna. From that same year, the psychoanalytic field began to consolidate the training criteria for psychoanalysts, integrating the question of *Wilde Psychoanalyse*.

⁴ Since psychoanalysis was made known by Freud, it began to evolve and transform into various schools, devices and techniques of intervention. Among its main exponents of the 20th century, some of whom ended up distancing themselves from Freud, it is worth mentioning Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), Alfred Adler (1870-1937), Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957) Melanie Klein (1882-1960), Wilfred Bion (1897-1979) and Donald Winnicott (1896-1971), who took Freud's central topics and reformulated them, giving way to new theories and psychoa-

In *Pueden los legos ejercer el análisis?* (1926/1992) –text that Freud wrote in defense of Theodor Reik, who had been accused by a patient of malpractice and by psychoanalyst doctors of being an intruder within psychoanalytic practice–, the father of psychoanalysis warned⁵ about the little convenience of psychiatry taking over psychoanalysis, which seems to have finally happened since medicine and psychiatry became the predominant perspective of practicing such praxis.

Furthermore, almost as old as psychoanalysis itself is the topic of the resistance it generates. Russel Jacoby (1983), for example, pointed out the repression of psychoanalysis that implied its domestication and adaptation to American society between the 1930s and 1940s. Regarding this scenario, Paul-Laurent Assoun (2006) affirmed that “el psicoanálisis tenía por esencia y vocación suscitar resistencias (Widerstände) en cierto modo estructurales [psychoanalysis had the essence and vocation to arouse resistance (Widerstände) in a certain way structural]”⁶ (p. 17). Due to the increasing frequency and intensity of these resistances, it was necessary for the founder of the school to adopt a position regarding the context and situation in the fields of politics, science and the university, specifying the conditions that a psychoanalyst “must” meet.

To respond to these pressures, the 1960s offered an ideal panorama for rethinking the structure of psychoanalysis. In this context, Jacques Lacan affirmed that “le psychanalyste ne s’autorise que de lui-même [the psychoanalyst only authorizes himself]” and a referent of the French Communist Party, Louis Althusser (1918-1990), proposed an open vindication of psychoanalysis within the framework of his radical reformulation of the work of Karl Marx in texts such as *Pour Marx, Lire Le Capital* and *Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État*.

The reformulations in the psychoanalytic current continued later and, in the 21st century, the debates are wide and extensive. There are issues that are still burning and have not yet been resolved. What is the role and relationship that psychoanalysis should assume regarding politics? Is it possible to identify antinomies within psychoanalysis about its functioning as an approach, device and/or practice? How to deconstruct the dominant structures and logics that seem to proliferate and be adopted without apparent conscious criticism of the potency of ideas and their inclination?

nalytic concepts. In this context, we must locate the “return to Freud” that, since the 1950s, Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) put forward, proposing a new modality of institutional organization.

⁵ It must be remembered that Reik was not a doctor, he had studied psychology at the University of Vienna, for which reason psychoanalysts were against his practice.

⁶ Throughout the text, the translations that have been placed between brackets are of our own elaboration.

The issues we have referred raise important dilemmas in psychoanalysis about practice and theory, clinic and culture, healing and political reflection. The words of Slavoj Žižek (2005) are related to these dilemmas, when he states that, when cultural studies are ignored in clinical practice, the latter remains trapped in a pre-theoretical empiricism, and when cultural studies deny the clinic, we end up in an empty ideological exercise.

There is a debt present in the questioning regarding the ideological exercise inserted in the usual practice. A wide variety of intellectuals only appeals to propose slight modifications of the productions and doctrines elaborated in the dominant centers, excluding what develops in what is conceived as the “margins” or the “periphery”. This situation finds its origin in one of the objectives of this work.⁷

From a brief historical tour of psychoanalysis in Latin America, we will exhibit some of the dilemmas and/or debates that cross the psychoanalytic field in the region and in the contemporary world. We will examine how Krajnik’s arguments fit into a larger project that seeks not only an expansion of the World Association of Psychoanalysis (WAP) headed by Jacques-Alain Miller, but a monopoly on psychoanalytic theory and its political effects by part of the organized Millerian clinical analysts. We will show how this process has manifested itself in Latin America since before Miller and his WAP. We will contemplate some current contributions of the Slovenian school that we will take up from a Latin American perspective. We will reflect on the theoretical, institutional, political, ideological and cultural implications of the domination and hegemony of the Millerian current in the psychoanalytic field. This logic of power, as will be seen, has not prevented the emergence and development of some radical and irreverent proposals. The proposals exist, but they failed: in some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Millerian psychoanalysis has been imposed even more intensely than in France itself. This poses a challenge and a dilemma worth questioning.

⁷ As Plotkin and Ruperthuz (2017) mentioned, “es sorprendente comprobar la ausencia casi total de menciones a América Latina en la gran mayoría de la historiografía general sobre el psicoanálisis, producida fundamentalmente en Europa o en los Estados Unidos. [...] Por otro lado –y esto también resulta significativo–, ninguna de las biografías sobre Freud hace referencia –con la excepción de algunas pocas menciones presentes en la clásica escrita por Ernest Jones –a los vínculos de Freud con personajes Latinoamericanos [it is surprising to note the almost total absence of mentions of Latin America in the vast majority of the general historiography of psychoanalysis, produced mainly in Europe or the United States. [...] On the other hand –and this is also significant– none of the biographies about Freud refer –except for a few mentions present in the classic written by Ernest Jones –to Freud’s links with Latin American characters]”. (pp. 10-11)

1. Is it possible to speak of a *new history of psychoanalysis in the 21st century?*

Pero así se desenmascara como un simple heredero de aquella primitiva reacción contra lo nuevo, como un nuevo disfraz para asegurar su subsistencia [But this is how he unmasks himself as a simple heir of that primitive reaction against the new, as a new disguise to ensure his subsistence]

FREUD, 1924 [1925].

Until the 1960s, the history of psychoanalysis was essentially hagiographic. These were stories that sought to highlight the Freudian epic and that reduced the history to a biography or, at most, to a summation or chain of biographies. *The life and work of Sigmund Freud* by Ernest Jones (1953) became, in this sense, the pattern and referent of this historiographical model.

In any case, the histories of psychoanalysis that emerged later began to present new and diverse approaches. Indeed, without ignoring the unavoidable relevance of Freud, they sought to locate psychoanalysis in a historical process that includes and overflows widely. This is the case of the ambitious research: *The Discovery of the Unconscious* by Henri Ellenberger (1970), *Freud and the Americans* by Nathan Hale (1971), *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France* by Elisabeth Roudinesco (1982) and *Freud: A Life for Our Time* by Peter Gay (1989), among many others.

However, these new narratives were clearly focused on their development in the central countries and the references to other contexts were, in general, merely anecdotal. One of these contexts was Latin American, which is striking, because as Pavón-Cuéllar (2020) puts it,

América Latina siempre se ha dejado infectar con mayor facilidad por las pestes provenientes de Europa. Ocurrió con la revolución, con la secularización y el anticlericalismo, con el marxismo, con el socialismo y el comunismo, incluso en parte con el anarquismo. Ha sucedido también de algún modo con el psicoanálisis [Latin America has always been more easily infected by pests from Europe. It happened with the revolution, with secularization and anti-clericalism, with Marxism, with socialism and communism, even in part with anarchism. It has also happened in some way with psychoanalysis].

In fact, the Chilean psychoanalyst and historian Mariano Rupertuz recently argued that “[s]i bien, el psicoanálisis se ha constituido como uno de los sistemas de pensamiento más influyentes en el mundo occidental a lo largo del siglo XX, no han existido investigaciones a nivel local que reconstruyan toda su riqueza como objeto histórico [while psychoanalysis has become one of the most influential sys-

tems of thought in the western world throughout the 20th century, there have been no investigations at the local level that have reconstructed all its richness as a historical object]” (2015, p. 35). It was towards the end of the last century that the first investigations into the history of psychoanalysis in Latin America began. These initially adopted an essentially local approach, proposing stories that showed the development of psychoanalysis at the national level (Balán, 1991; Plotkin, 2000; Vezzetti, 1989, 1996). It will be at the dawn of this century that a transnational or even regional perspective began to be adopted, which will seek to illuminate the drifts of psychoanalysis in Latin America.

These works allow us to recover and exhibit the assiduous exchanges that, from an early date, Chilean, Brazilian, Mexican, Colombian, Peruvian and Argentine intellectuals and doctors maintained with Sigmund Freud. In *Estimado doctor Freud: Una historia cultural del psicoanálisis en América Latina*, Plotkin and Rupertuz (2017) reveal the correspondence that Freud maintained with his regional followers –with some of whom he held personal interviews in Vienna (Scholten & Ferrari, 2018)– as well as the incorporation of their books and publications into his personal library.

These diverse histories of psychoanalysis also allow us to illuminate a much more complex panorama than a mere direct and unidirectional relationship between production centers and peripheral countries. In addition to showing the impact of social, cultural and political contexts, they allow us to account for the role played by local and regional figures in the diffusion of psychoanalytic production in Latin America, which was not limited simply to reproducing foreign models. In any case, no local or Latin American school of psychoanalysis, as in the case of England, France and even the USA, was established, and references to Freud, Klein, Lacan, and others will be a constant source of authority for their followers in the region.

In general terms, this centralizing bias is also present in the institutional history of psychoanalysis in Latin America. The Sociedade Brasileira de Psicanálise (SBP) and the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association were the first to be recognized by the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), promoted by Freud in 1910, for which they had to meet the requirement of including in their ranks a didactic analyst, who should have been trained as such in Europe. For decades the IPA's local branches, mostly driven by doctors, were recognized as the legitimate training ground for psychoanalysts, until alternative spaces to the *establishment*⁸ began to emerge. This is the case, for example, of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires

⁸ Since 1925, at the IX International Congress of Psychoanalysis, didactic analysis had been established together with control analysis (supervision) and theoretical training, as the fundamental triad in the training of a psychoanalyst. In the cases of Brazil and Argentina, it was possible to meet these conditions after the arrival in Brazil

(FSBA) that was founded on the initiative of Oscar Masotta in 1974, following the model of his Parisian namesake directed by Jacques Lacan, whose work was already beginning to spread in Mexico and Argentina since the end of the previous decade. The reference center moves here from London, headquarters of the IPA, to the capital city of France.⁹

At the same time, a problem was highlighted that, although it knew antecedents, will assume a particular relevance in this context: the relationship of psychoanalysis with politics. In the hectic climate that the region was going through at that time, the propagation and appropriation of the ideas of Louis Althusser (Rodríguez Arriagada & Starcenbaum, 2017), already mentioned previously, began while the contributions of various figures of “Freudomarxism” were rescued. In general terms, these were figures from outside the psychoanalytic movement (even expelled from its ranks, as in the case of Wilhelm Reich). At the regional level, it is worth mentioning at least the case of the *Platform* and *Document* groups, formed by members of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association who submitted their resignation from the institution in 1971, for essentially political-ideological reasons.

However, the subsequent development of the psychoanalytic movement at the regional level maintained an essentially clinical bias. With a few exceptions, it sought to keep psychoanalysis away from politics, and initiatives to incorporate Freudian conceptions into political debates were external to the psychoanalytic *establishment* –that is, alien to psychoanalytic institutions that, over the following decades, fragmented, dissolved and multiplied.

On the other hand, from the 1980s, the relationship of psychoanalysis with the academic field began to be reformulated. This is especially remarkable in the case of Argentina: in 1985, the law of professional practice of psychology was sanctioned, which authorized psychologists to practice psychotherapy, at the same time, the plan of the psychology career of the University of Buenos Aires was radically renewed and the Faculty of Psychology was created –whose cloisters are occupied mostly by psychoanalysts, many of them come from the ranks of Lacanism. This turned the academic field into a space for the training of psychoanalysts, parallel or complementary to the *multiverse* of psychoanalytic institutions –whose activities,

of the German psychoanalyst Adelheid Koch in 1936, and the Spanish psychoanalyst Ángel Garma, who had trained at the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin, in Argentina in 1938.

⁹ In 1953, Lacan himself came into conflict with the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris and founded, together with Daniel Lagache, the French Society of Psychoanalysis. However, it was not yet in his plans to leave the ranks of the IPA. This rupture was finally imposed in 1964, which led Lacan to found the Freudian School of Paris, which he led until its dissolution in 1980. Masotta (1976) presented the EFBA to Lacan in 1975 and was appointed as an analyst member of the Parisian institution.

from the legal point of view, did not qualify for the exercise of psychoanalysis, but whose representatives were integrated into university chairs.

Now, after more than three decades, both the “political potential” of psychoanalysis and the valid spaces of psychoanalytic training seem to be under discussion. More precisely, different assessments are proposed regarding the application of psychoanalytic concepts and ideas beyond the narrow framework of the clinic. While, in some cases, considerations about “good use” are restricted to the scope of the clinic and are promoted within the framework of psychoanalytic institutions that operate in parallel or outside the university environment; in other cases, it is figures from the academic space who propose an extended application of psychoanalysis that allows illuminating the current socio-political scenario.

2. Against the elitization of psychoanalysis: Contributions and challenges of the Slovenian School

Only the concept can be truly added to a world. Unreflected practices cannot but handle what is already there. Therefore, the way to summarize Žižek's politics is through the title of his talk in the first series of the Idea of Communism conferences: “to begin from the beginning”, that is to say, a ruthless insistence on theoretical (philosophical) rigor with a realistic and pragmatic intervention in our predicament. When Žižek calls us to “step back and think” it is not a call of the “beautiful soul”—that position that presupposes the higher moral position of a given subjectivity that will do no wrong. The urge to do nothing doesn't imply a neutral position with regard to a certain political development, a political event, popular uprising, or even elections, critique or even celebrate them from a certain (usually a safe) distance. Žižek does not urge us to withdraw from acting into thinking, thus occupying a position that, from a higher “moral” position, is always afraid of wrongdoings.

AGON HAMZA

The main interest of some texts worth addressing is that they contain “*timeless elements*” (Merkl), “*universal ideas*” (Bluhm), “*wisdom without time*” (Catlin) or some “*universal application*” (Hacker). These documents, by virtue of their characteristics, are contributions to the field recognized as “*the history of ideas*” (Skinner, 2000).

In the psychoanalytic field—specifically in some sectors of the movement led by Jacques-Alain Miller—an internal structure is reproduced, sometimes weak in its

theoretical rigor, strongly conservative and elitist, but very profitable, being a faithful ally of academic positions. These are some of the reasons why it has managed to penetrate the most remote corners of the planet, generating true sects that have turned psychoanalysis into a mere depoliticized product and with logics related to neoliberalism.

Regarding the apparent depoliticization that Millerian psychoanalysis can present externally, Slavoj Žižek (2020) has observed that in the last decade a liberal cynicism of enjoyment has clearly been promoted, actively intervening in the socio-political space and actively attacking what could be called “*the left*”¹⁰. In the opposite direction and seeking to exhibit the logics of the dominant discourses, we find precisely Žižek himself, one of the founders of *Ljubljanska lakanovska šola* (Lacanian School of Ljubljana), also integrated by other contemporary philosophers such as Mladen Dolar and Alenka Zupančič.¹¹

The rivalry between the Ljubljana school and Jacques-Alain Miller’s World Psychoanalytic Association (WAP) was especially evident in 2017. In this year, the Slovenian psychoanalyst Nina Krajnik, supported by Miller and the WAP, led a campaign against Slavoj Žižek and his collaborators. The violent tone of the campaign, on which we will dwell in the next section, can be exemplified by the titles “In the jaws of Žižek” (Krajnik, 2017a) or “Žižek, the fraud” (2017b), used in the articles published in the French Millerian magazine *Lacan Quotidien*. The articles included strong accusations of “misleading” use and the spread of a “false” version of psychoanalysis. These accusations inevitably lead us to wonder about the distinction between the “true” and the “false” of stories and interpretations, a distinction that, in itself, contains an impossibility (Schaff, 1982; Pons, 2004; Ginzburg, 2011; Jaksic, 2013).

3. Krajnik vs. Žižek: A crusade against “true” psychoanalysis

The distinction between true and false is the guiding axis of Krajnik’s campaign against Žižek. This campaign aims to rectify and refute what is unambiguously described as “falsehood” and “falsification” (Gilbert, 2017, par. 12), as “delirium”, as “deception” (Krajnik, 2017a, pp. 11-12), as “fraud”, as “quackery”, as “slander” and “sophistic comments” (Krajnik, 2017b, p. 9). There are no gradual transitions or half-measures between true and false here. The two terms also do not interpen-

¹⁰ References obtained through a personal communication with the Slovenian philosopher.

¹¹ According to Slavoj Žižek, in a personal communication, these names have been joined by younger and “much more Lacanian” philosophers such as: Simon Hajdini, Gregor Moder, Samo Tomšič, Jure Simoniti.

trate, problematize or transcend in more complex configurations such as those that psychoanalysis discovers in dreams, lapses or symptoms.

It is disconcerting that Krajnik, speaking in the name of the psychoanalytic clinic, uses a criterion of truth more akin to the legal field or to the first chapter of a school textbook of propositional logic. This pre-philosophical criterion does not serve to think about the nuances of the psychoanalytic practice supposedly defended by Krajnik in his struggle against the Lacanian philosophy of Žižek. The true that is revealed in the false or that has a fictional structure, for example, does not exist in the binary simplism with which Krajnik's Manichean argumentation operates. For her, everything is too simple: either you are in the truth or you are in the lie, and it is obviously she who is always in the truth, while Žižek is hopelessly in the lie.

In Krajnik's argumentation, in which there is no room for any dialectic, the false is the contradictory, while the true is tautological. The truth that Krajnik attributes to himself is that of being what he is, that of being the psychoanalyst and Lacanian that he is, while the falsehood that she repeatedly imputes to Žižek is that of being what he is not or that of offering something that is what he is not. According to Krajnik, Žižek is in the false, he is false, because he “introdujo el psicoanálisis sin psicoanálisis [introduced psychoanalysis without psychoanalysis]” (Krajnik, 2017b, p. 9); because “logró marcarse a sí mismo como psicoanalista, aunque no lo es [he managed to mark himself as a psychoanalyst, although he is not]” (Gilbert, 2017, par. 7); because, just as Alain Badiou would be a “revolutionary without revolution”, so Žižek would be a “psicoanalista sin psicoanálisis [psychoanalyst without psychoanalysis]” (Krajnik, 2017c, p. 6).

Note that Žižek's problem, for Krajnik, is not exactly to pretend to be what he is not, but to be so without being so, to be what he lacks, the supposed in what he lacks. This definition of the false psychoanalyst could be the very definition of the true analyst, the one who does not take himself seriously as such, the one who puts himself in the place of the object, the one who does not get lost by essentializing, by identifying himself with his role in the analysis, but such subtleties have no place in a broad-stroked argument like Krajnik's. For her, Žižek is simply what it is not because it works like a counterfeit currency that is because it works, but it is not because it is the product of a counterfeit. In circular reasoning, it is false because it is counterfeit, without us knowing well why the hell it is counterfeit.

Žižek's comparison to a counterfeit coin is not Krajnik's own merit, but comes, according to her, from Jacques-Alain Miller. It is he who would have said “once” that “la Sociedad de Žižek para el psicoanálisis teórico es la fausse monnaie, un dinero falso [Žižek's Society for theoretical psychoanalysis is *the fausse monnaie*, a

fake money]”, which, according to Krajnik’s penetrating interpretation, means that Žižek is “trading” with a currency that “es un fraude [is a fraud]”, whose value “es falso [is false]” (Gilbert, 2017, par. 12). Žižek would be false because it is false. No matter how much we squeeze Krajnik’s speech, we will not get anything more out of it at the level of rational argumentation. It is always about the same reasons that are repeated, the same argumentative circularity, the same tautologies. There is no room for the logical connection of one reason with another in reasoning, which could explain in part, at least in part, Krajnik’s repugnance towards the theoretical and the philosophical.

What there is in Krajnik is the multiplication of disjointed and unfounded reasons to justify her attack on Žižek. In addition to attacking him as false, she attacks him as a “plagiarist”, because his work “se basaría enteramente en el plagio de los textos de Jacques-Alain Miller [would be based entirely on the plagiarism of Jacques-Alain Miller’s texts]” (Krajnik, 2017b, p. 8), and because he would be together with Badiou one of the “dos grandes plagiadores de Lacan [two great plagiarists of Lacan]” (2017c, p. 6). Žižek is also attacked for selling his books, for selling them even though he has left-wing convictions, which would be “buen ejemplo [a good example]” of “capitalismo que puede vender el comunismo [capitalism that can sell communism]” (Gilbert, 2017, par. 11). These extravagant incriminations can be included in the same category of accusations against Žižekian falsehood: Žižek would be falsely communist for selling his books, just as he would be false in his ideas by pretending that they are his when in fact they would be Lacan’s and Miller’s.

4. Clinical vs. theory: Against supposedly non-existent theoretical psychoanalysis

Of the various acts that would falsify the Žižekian contribution, the most serious for Krajnik are curiously those of theorizing and philosophizing. Žižek’s great deceptions would be theoretical psychoanalysis and Lacanian philosophy. This is where the crux of the fraud lies.

For Krajnik, theoretical psychoanalysis is fraudulent because it is “algo que no existe [something that does not exist]” (Gilbert, 2017, par. 12), while Lacanian philosophy is misleading because it is philosophy, because philosophy, as Lacan said, is an “sueño eterno [eternal dream]” (Krajnik, 2017c, p. 7). In both cases, we have a huge deception into which everyone would have fallen in Slovenia, where “nadie entra en análisis, todos estudian Lacan; nadie hace los cambios políticos, todos los piensan [nobody goes into analysis, everyone studies Lacan; No one makes political

changes, everyone thinks them]” (2017d, par. 10). The problem is to think and study Lacan. This study and this thought are unbearable to Krajnik.

It must be recognized, in all honesty, that Krajnik’s approach has its nuances. What is deceptive is to think the political without doing it or studying Lacan without analyzing it. The deception lies not so much in theory as such, but rather in “la teoría sin la clínica [theory without the clinic]” (Krajnik, 2017c, p. 7), or in “la clínica que es simplemente un adorno de la grandiosidad del conocimiento filosófico [the clinic that is simply an ornament of the grandeur of philosophical knowledge]” (2017a, p. 12). Philosophy must submit to the psychoanalytic clinic and not maintain its freedom as in Žižek and in the other Lacanian philosophers of Slovenia. This freedom is the alleged deception denounced by Krajnik.

The great Slovenian fraud, in Krajnik’s (2017a) own terms, is that “nadie necesita hacer análisis para desarrollar conceptos psicoanalíticos [no one needs to do analysis to develop psychoanalytic concepts]” when studying “fenómenos sociales y culturales [social and cultural phenomena]” (p. 12). An interpretation in Freudian or Lacanian terms would require, for Krajnik, the experience of the couch. In the absence of such experience, the interpretation would be fraudulent. The fraud, under this criterion, would not be only of certain Slovenian philosophers, but of some structuralists and post-structuralists, of several exponents of the Frankfurt School and of a large part of the most important thinkers of the last century who would have deceived us by using psychoanalytic concepts without being analysts or analyzers.

Krajnik throws overboard most of the philosophical thought nurtured by psychoanalysis in the last century. For her, the true thought inspired by the Freudian heritage is that which arises in a direct relationship with the couch. Everything else is a simple “defensa contra el psicoanálisis [defense against psychoanalysis]” (Gilbert, 2017, par. 9), even “la defensa más fuerte contra el psicoanálisis que existe en nuestro tiempo [the strongest defense against psychoanalysis that exists in our time]” (Krajnik, 2017a, p. 12). This is because the psychoanalytic, as Krajnik conceives it, it is only in the analysis that is made and not in what is thought.

Krajnik (2017a) goes so far as to suggest that “psicoanálisis laciano [Lacanian psychoanalysis]” (p. 11) did not exist in Slovenia before her. What Žižek, Zupančič and Dolar have done for decades would have nothing to do with psychoanalysis, consisting at most of its “mal uso filosófico [philosophical misuse]” (2017c, p. 7). For Krajnik, psychoanalysis is exclusively in the clinic and in the schools and organizations that support it. Thus, the psychoanalytic is reduced to a liberal profession of health, a medicine of the soul, a specialized technique, and it is repressed as an act, as political subversion, symptom of history, cultural force

and intellectual adventure. It is the same repression that psychoanalysis suffered when it expanded during the 1930s and 1940s in the United States (Jacoby, 1983). It is the same repression against which Lacan revolted in criticizing the psychology of the self.

Krajnik tries to reverse the return of the repressed. Psychoanalysis, for her, can only be a clinical, technical, specialized, professional, associative, Millerian work. As for theoretical psychoanalysis and Lacanian philosophy, they are literally a “desviación [deviation]” that “hace daño al psicoanálisis [harms psychoanalysis]”, an “discurso antilacanian [anti-Lacanian discourse]” (Krajnik, 2017a, p. 12), a “traición a una causa analítica [betrayal of an analytical cause]” (2017b, p. 9). These words are exactly the same as those used in the communist parties in the stage of greatest bureaucratization and persecution of dissent. Krajnik’s tone is not only pathetic and frenetic, but violent, dogmatic and intolerant.

Krajnik’s words, moreover, involve a strange fetishization of Freudian and Lacanian heritages. What could psychoanalysis be to be *harmed* by the simple fact of theorizing it without the clinic? Why would a discourse already be *anti-Lacanian* because it is not based on the experience of analysis? All this is too enigmatic and betrays an irrational, sectarian and persecutory relationship with psychoanalysis.

Krajnik’s message is very clear: if you are not in the clinic, you are against psychoanalysis. In order not to be anti-Lacanian, one must “aceptar las consecuencias [accept the consequences]” of “ser lacanian [being Lacanian]”, that is, “practicar el análisis [practice analysis]” (Krajnik, 2017b, p. 9). Only the psychoanalyst can think of psychoanalysis consistently, truthfully, and without *harming it*.

5. From Slovenia to Latin America, from Krajnik to Miller, from superstructural truth to the base of economic and political power

Psychoanalytic theory is for Krajnik the monopoly of clinical psychoanalysts, preferably millennials, members of WAP. What is at stake here is not only truth, but power and money. Krajnik says it clearly when attacking Žižek and the other Lacanian philosophers in the field of their “recursos financieros [financial resources]”, their influence on “departamentos universitarios [university departments]” (2017a, p. 12), their “conexiones en los ministerios [connections in ministries]”, the “presupuesto público para asegurar las publicaciones de su agenda [public budget to ensure the publications of their agenda]” (2017b, p. 9). In short, in the entire conflict with Žižek, what is at issue is who will have “el poder sobre el significante

Lacan [power over the signifier Lacan]”, according to Krajnik’s own expression (Gilbert, 2017, par. 6). This power is political, but above all economic. Thus, we come to the root of the problem.

At the economic-political basis of the conflict, Krajnik is openly defending a monopoly of Lacanian psychoanalysis in Slovenia for Millerian clinical psychoanalysts members of the WAP. This requires her, at the superstructural level, to discredit the theorists and philosophers who seem to have monopoly power over the signifier “Lacan” now and for three decades. It is an advertising strategy against the main competition in a petty market logic.

Krajnik’s advertising strategy in Slovenia was the same as Jacques-Alain Miller was simultaneously developing in the world. This strategy became evident, just before Krajnik’s campaign, when Miller (2017) threatened his competitors who “*hacían malabares con juguetes tomados de Lacan para entretener a un público aturdido y que recorrían los campus estadounidenses jugando a los matamoros pseudo-comunistas [juggled toys taken from Lacan to entertain a stunned audience and who roamed American campuses playing pseudo-communist matamoros]*” (p. 10). In a clear allusion to Žižek and his followers, Miller announced the expansion of the range of products offered by a powerful transnational, the WAP, which would now venture into the profitable sector of politics. This sector could not be left in the hands of theorists and philosophers!

It must be well understood that Krajnik’s interests are those of the WAP. The purpose is to conquer the Slovenian market with the French Millerian franchise. It is a phenomenon that we already know quite well in Latin America, where the various associations and schools of psychoanalysis compete with each other for market dominance, which also makes them enter into rivalry with other competitors, including intellectuals, theorists and philosophers, who often receive questions very close to those received by Žižek, Zupančič and Dolar in Slovenia.

Krajnik’s arguments are nothing more than variations or exaggerations of the automatic formula “*le falta clínica [he lacks clinical]*” systematically used in Latin America to disqualify the psychoanalytic contributions of the new “laymen” or “profane”. Intellectuals and academics, as well as members of other psychoanalytic collectives, are instantly neutralized by reproaching them in a lapidary way for “lacking clinic”. This formula, which is heard in Argentina as well as in Chile, Colombia and Mexico, has served and continues to serve so that the Freudian and now Lacanian heritage is monopolized by schools and associations, such as the WAP, which function according to the institutional forms currently most favored by neoliberal capitalism, such as sects, corporations, lucrative companies, elitist clubs, professional guilds and other interest groups.

Psychoanalytic schools and associations not only tend to turn psychoanalysis into an onerous privilege of the wealthy classes of Latin America, but also isolate it from society, attenuate its cultural strength, weaken its theoretical vigor, de-intellectualize it, reduce it to a headless professional activity and seem to depoliticize it by disassociating it from radical movements and abandoning it to conservative inertia logically related to neoliberalism. The latter has been verified in the political positions of Latin American psychoanalysts affiliated with the WAP and supported by Miller: positions against the lack of rule of law in the leftist regimes of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, but not against the violence of the right-wing regimes of Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico and Sebastián Piñera in Chile; pronouncements in favor of the Bolivian coup and racist right, but not in support of the Chilean, Ecuadorian and Colombian progressive and democratic social movements.

It is no coincidence that the Millerian bloc simultaneously supported the reactionary right in Latin America and Macron's neoliberal political option in the last elections in France (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2018). Nor is it a coincidence that it was the same bloc that gave its unconditional support to Krajnik's campaign against theoretical psychoanalysis in Slovenia. All three supports go in the same direction.

By suppressing the theory, an empty space is left for what always springs up in its place: what should continue to be called by its name, the dominant ideology, with which both the visions of the French and Latin American right and the reduction of psychoanalysis to a petty professional practice well paid and well adapted to neoliberal capitalist society can be justified. This practice is the truth of the *truth* underlying the clinic defended by Krajnik against the supposed deception of theoretical psychoanalysis. It is the same truth invoked by wealthy Latin American psychoanalysts, those who have their offices in the Mexican neighborhood of Polanco or in the Argentine neighborhood of Palermo, against theorists: intellectuals, academics and politically committed activists who apparently “les falta clínica [lack clinical]”, which causes them to deviate –as Krajnik would say– towards radical left positions in their work of repoliticization of psychoanalysis.

The overestimation of the empirical pole of the clinic, always at the expense of theory, is a maneuver that can only benefit the dominant ideology, which is imposed with experience, which can only be hindered by theory. This would have been clear to Althusser (1996a, 1996b), but it will never be clear to his brilliant student Miller, much less to the not so brilliant students of the student, precisely because clarity would require a theory that they must do without in order to continue justifying themselves with the ideological effectiveness of their arguments, as Gabriel Tupinambá (2019) has recently shown. What Althusser predicted happened, once again, as so many other times.

6. Beyond the biomedical model in psychoanalysis

Previously, we have referred to a clear discussion and/or theoretical, practical debate, bordering on ethical issues between the North American associations of psychoanalysis –which became powerful towards the end of the 1930s due to the emigration of psychoanalysts to North America– and the European associations of psychoanalysis.

It should be noted that what was discussed between the United States (New York Psychoanalytic Society) and the International Psychoanalytic Association in Europe at the end of the 1920s was that the American side did not accept non-medical psychoanalysts to exercise the psychoanalytic practice. This position did not change until the end of the 20th century, accepting non-medical professionals to practice psychoanalysis at the beginning of the 1990s.

Freud always defended non-medical exercise in psychoanalytic practice and believed that in this way the practice could benefit from other theories and disciplines. In a letter to psychoanalyst Fritz Wittels, who was in the United States, he comments:

Me place saber que comparte mi opinión sobre el valor del análisis en los tratamientos médicos, en pedagogía y en la formación cultural en general, sin restricciones. No obstante, si se presentara usted allí con mi programa en favor de la aplicación del análisis lego, suscitara la hostilidad de los analistas médicos cuya desconfianza hacia nuevos visitantes de nuestro círculo aumentaría. En América no puede imponerse este criterio. (...) Desde luego, no quiero decir que debe usted descartar la cuestión del lego, o mantener en secreto su opinión; pero no haga bandera de ella. A esos primitivos les interesa poco toda ciencia que no tenga aplicación práctica directa. Lo peor del modo de ser norteamericano es su llamada amplitud de criterio, por la que se sienten hasta magnánimos y superiores a nosotros, los intolerantes europeos; esto, en realidad, no es sino el práctico velo con el que tapan su completa falta de discernimiento. Ellos elaboran –casi a modo de tendencias inconscientes– un compromiso o mezcla de análisis, misticismo junguiano y adlerismo, una estupidez vergonzosa, naturalmente, que sólo merece burla. Esta labor les resulta tanto más fácil por cuanto no han leído prácticamente ninguna de las publicaciones originales, por falta de tiempo y de voluntad.

[I am pleased to know that you share my opinion on the value of analysis in medical treatments, in pedagogy and in cultural formation in general, without restrictions. However, if you were to go there with my programme in favour of the application of lay analysis, you would arouse the hostility of medical analysts whose distrust of new visitors to our circle would increase. In America, this criterion cannot be imposed. [...] Of course, I do not mean that you should dismiss the question of the layman, or keep his opinion secret; but don't flag it. These primitives care little about any science that has no direct practical application. The worst thing about the American way of being is its so-called broad-mindedness, whereby they feel even magnanimous and superior to us, the intolerant Europeans; this, in reality,

is nothing but the practical veil with which they cover their complete lack of discernment. They elaborate –almost like unconscious tendencies– a compromise or mixture of analysis, Jungian mysticism and adlerism, a shameful stupidity, naturally, that deserves only mockery. This task is all the easier for them because they have read virtually none of the original publications, due to lack of time and will]. (Timms, 1997, p. 105)

Beyond certain Freudian prejudices regarding American society in this letter, what is also questioned there is the pragmatic character that neglects, as Freud himself points out, any element that is not at the service of a direct practical application. Isn't this discussion about secular analysis the current antecedent of the affirmation that psychoanalytic environments “le falta clínica [lack clinically]”?

Faced with this question, it is necessary to recall the fact that although for several decades non-medical professionals have been able to engage in psychoanalytic practice, and they are admitted to the different psychoanalytic schools and institutions that provide “official” psychoanalyst training –including those of the International Psychoanalytic Association– the medical logic underlying clinical practices is still being upheld.

Let us not forget that it is this same implicit perpetuation of the maintenance of the formal “requirements” that turned the clinic into another branch of medical psychopathology, with its defense mechanisms, its rigid frameworks that did not allow psychoanalytic practice to be removed from the offices and couches, their diagnoses including the so-called “low transference” based on the clinical structures of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Not to mention the “presentations of patients” that Lacan himself helped to consolidate.

Fortunately, there is also another Lacan and other Lacanian psychoanalytic practices that among other things do not base their act from a diagnosis to be able to “direct” a cure, the French psychoanalyst Allouch (2006) comments:

Muchos psicoanalistas dicen que primero hay que tener un diagnóstico para saber qué tratamiento seguir. Sin embargo, en la práctica psicoanalítica, cuando una persona le habla a otra, no hay necesidad de establecer previamente un diagnóstico. Algunos imaginan que el diagnóstico ayuda para psicoanalizar, para intervenir, pero no es así. El psicoanálisis no es una medicina.

[Many psychoanalysts say that you must first have a diagnosis to know which treatment to follow. However, in psychoanalytic practice, when one person speaks to another, there is no need to pre-establish a diagnosis. Some imagine that diagnosis helps to psychoanalyze, to intervene, but it is not so. Psychoanalysis is not a measure]. (Allouch, 2006, par. 4).

In this sense, we can identify that the medical heritage that prevailed in the various psychoanalytic associations after Freud continued to prevail in the Lacanians, and today. It is this inheritance that ultimately continues to impose the existence of a “true”, “official” and “institutionalized” psychoanalysis, one that for many should not leave the “analytical device” of the clinics, differentiated that “true” psychoanalysis devoted exclusively to the clinical, and that, of course, cannot leave its “natural environment” and be led to an analysis of social phenomena or sociopolitical dilemmas.

7. What is excluded from the clinic: the clinic

The way in which psychoanalysis has been constituted in most cases in Latin America, and how it spread (like a plague, using the Lacanian myth of Freud and Jung reaching America) was that of a practice that was consolidated as “clinical”, a psychoanalysis that some call in “intention” to refer to it as a pure and true practice, that which begins with Freud and continues with others and ends with Lacan and the Lacanians, leaving psychoanalysis in “extension” as a minor matter.

The difference between *clinical* and *psychoanalyst* was addressed by Lacan in different contexts, texts and occasions. It is precisely from this fact that many psychoanalysts turned their practice into a hermetic question that could only be known in select and limited groups. Fortunately, the exceptions are many, there are gaps, loopholes where subjects emerge that no longer sustain these practices, being active agents in the true struggle for the implantation of a hegemonic and dominant psychoanalysis.

In Latin America, for example, there are many examples of psychoanalysts who have managed to remove psychoanalysis from the sacrosanct clinics: Marie Langer (1910-1987), Enrique Pichon-Rivi re (1907-1977) or Fernando Olloa (1918-2002), just to mention a few in Argentina, even Estanislao Zuleta (1935-1990) or  lvaro Villar Gaviria (1921-1999). The list would be long including Mexico, Brazil, Chile and other countries.

In our opinion, this is where the Slovenian School of Psychoanalysis becomes important through Dolar, Zupancic and  i ek. It is usually thought that these authors, being philosophers, only provide theoretical tools to be able to think or re-think the philosophical discipline, art or popular culture, and from that background, articulate it with some psychoanalytic elements. It is also often thought that these theories, in the best of cases, serve to reflect on social issues from certain psychoanalytic elements.

The idea is to dare to weigh in something more, that these approaches of the Slovenian School, despite the fact that they themselves refuse to be clinical and to be cataloged as psychoanalysts, serve to think about the clinic and that their contributions serve to question a practice that little by little has become ideological under an ideal of purity or the existence of a true clinic that only sustains itself in the transfer between analyst-analysand within the limits of the consulting room and the couch.

This dilemma that has been developed in a general and in-depth way in this work, becomes important in a social context where only space is left for the ideal of a “pure” psychoanalytic praxis focused and allowed for the “pure”, which in this case they are of an elitist whiteness both for the speaker and for the listener.

Lacan (2003) already warned when he stated that we cannot be “garantes del sueño burgués [guarantors of the bourgeois dream]” (p. 362), where analysts confine themselves to a couch at the service of people who can pay high costs under the assumption that this is how the unconscious is made to work and be able to solve “intimate” problems.

It is necessary to assume that there is an impossibility of talking about a psychoanalysis. Actually, we would have to dare to speak of “psychoanalysis” of “clinical practices” in the plural, since it is always a socio-symbolic matter, it has to do with the Other and has “una dimensión intrínsecamente social, objetiva y crítica [an intrinsically social, objective and critical dimension]” (Zupancic, 2013, p. 12).

Psychoanalytic praxis must take care of pointing out that the realities that appear to be immutable in Latin American contexts are not such, that the socio-symbolic reality where a subject is immersed is the result of fixations of jouissance that, through signifiers, locate it in a social discourse, and just as it could be located there, it could develop a know-how to be able to locate itself in another place, but not before being able to question that place and its relationship with an Other.¹²

The point is that despite these norms that have governed psychoanalytic training and clinical practice, it must always be linked to a theoretical interrogation. Both in Freud and Lacan as in other psychoanalysts, this question comes from different disciplines, even from the same philosophy. For example, the fact that Freud has remained outside philosophy does not mean that he did not use it for the same

¹² But in that same “neutral” place, certain psychoanalytic practices have historically been located, from Freudian through Klenian to Lacanian, all of them traversed by a medicalized ideal, turning clinical practice into a supposed practice without ideals –as if clinical practice was outside the ideals– returning from the repressed the ideal without ideal of a practice without context, an aseptic practice. Thus, for almost a century, most psychoanalysts did not get involved with anything beyond their clinic, confined to their office.

clinic and, in the case of Lacan and his antiphilosophy, its use is even more widespread and almost all his work is crossed by authors such as Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Plato, and other disciplines such as ethnology and mathematics or in the last years of topology or string theory.

In short, the theory serves to question what is put into action in clinical practice. But the clinic on many occasions fell into a kind of technical formulation, and thus a practice was ritualized, standardizing it.

In Latin America, despite presenting a series of psychoanalytic practitioners who are faithful participants of different Lacanian schools and institutions that are founded as branches obedient to the opinions that are almost always written in Paris, there are as always disobedient, and fortunately there are more and more. There are those who question this colonizing knowledge and practice in which psychoanalysis has also been involved. Others try to contextualize this theory with a praxis in public health systems or even propose an exercise in psychoanalytic listening in public squares or on the streets; others by converging psychoanalytic theory and practice with other knowledge, not only traditional such as philosophy and social sciences, but indigenous and Afro-descendant ancestral knowledge.

All this provides new perspectives on psychoanalytic practice. By linking the clinical signifier with other signifiers, this practice is reworking a new future in Latin American contexts and takes it out of what dominated psychoanalysis for many years: the office as the exclusive space for psychoanalysis. That is the clinic that can bring us in a commitment to a praxis in Latin America, one that is up to the subjectivity of the time so as not to renounce that impossible thing that is to try to sustain a praxis from psychoanalysis.

8. Conclusions on the remaining challenges

So far, some of the contributions and challenges of what is known as The Slovenian School have been reviewed, understanding that psychoanalytic clinical practice and theory requires, from our point of view, new approaches. In this it becomes necessary to rigorously and critically approach the study of the productions that the authors of this philosophical movement have been producing for decades.

It is necessary to incorporate and accept new interpretative prisms that are up to the demands of individuals, of society. It is necessary not to limit ourselves exclusively to the study of European authors, and to follow their texts and indications without adopting a critical position. Only by questioning both external and

internal productions and practices we can abandon what seems to be perpetuating: continuing to cling to Eurocentric practices and theories of the last century.¹³

However, we must see that, from early date, the study of philosophical, theoretical or literary works of other times was one of the focuses most addressed by large groups of historians. It was not a phenomenon concentrated in a specific historical moment, it is a common practice among scholars of the social sciences to resort to the legacies of those exponents or classical references. At present, this practice seems to have undergone some slight modifications in the local terrain where in emphasis they are not only in authors of other times, but authors who, although they are from other times, are also European.

Scholars and writers of the 21st century resort to these practices repeatedly, specifically there is an inevitable return to the history of ideas¹⁴, since this field quickly became a different and singular field with a wide variety of resources that began to articulate their framework. Understanding this, we do not affirm that the study of Sigmund Freud or Jacques Lacan is something that must be set aside to advance, or progress, let us remember that both opposed the term progress, due to the imposed violence that exists in it. If not, we invite you to leave the modality of faithful subjects who try to be part of the select groups that today “officially” continue with their unfinished legacy.

In this sense, we consider that not only the Slovenian School is a contribution to the field of the history of ideas, being a process of history in construction, something that is developing or gestating incipiently but that has managed to produce a theoretical and critical power regarding the unethical practices that try to spread. It must be clarified that we are not indicating here to a limit to movement, a more or less correct direction. Nor do we propose a singular device of universal applicability. It would be falling into the same abyss from which we intend to get out. We only point to one of the many current contributions that are being produced by authors not only from the world of psychoanalysis, but from fields usually little considered.

One of the concepts that can help us summarize the issues between the supposedly true and the false, or the place that psychoanalysis has in our time, is the notion of ideology, understanding it in its broadest sense, as Slavoj Žižek (1994) points out in *Mapping Ideology*:

¹³ For this, we aim at a reconfiguration of the logics that are currently dominant, and from here, it becomes necessary to revalue the scope of the local contributions.

¹⁴ According to Donal R. Kelley (2002), the history of ideas had its independent birth in the 19th century, until before this, it was related to philosophy without establishing any distinction. It was Victor Cousin who named the field we know today as such as “L’histoire des idées”. Therefore, the starting point for this document finds its origin in Cousin’s work.

La palabra “ideología” puede designar cualquier cosa, desde una actitud contemplativa que desconoce su dependencia de la realidad social hasta un conjunto de creencias orientadas a la acción, desde el medio indispensable en el que los individuos viven sus relaciones con una estructura social hasta las ideas falsas que legitiman un poder político dominante. Parecería surgir justamente cuando intentamos evitarla, mientras que no aparece cuando es claramente esperable.

[The word “ideology” can designate anything from a contemplative attitude that ignores its dependence on social reality to a set of action-oriented beliefs, from the indispensable environment in which individuals live their relationships with a social structure to the false ideas that legitimize a dominant political power. It would seem to arise just when we try to avoid it, while it does not appear when it is clearly expected]. (p. 10)

This antagonism presented when trying to define the concept of ideology can be extrapolated to the complexity of defining a clinical practice, a concept, an approach, a movement. However, this dilemma seems to be easy for some institutions to address by replacing questions and turning psychoanalysis into one more product that is part of the showcases of their formative processes. Is it possible to think of a psychoanalysis without it being an ally of capitalism and the ideology that corrupts our world? We believe that it is possible, even though it is not something that is common, nor are there traces of the direction that should be taken for such release to occur.

For now, the local challenges and the challenges of the psychoanalytic discipline show their tension in those elements that do not seem to be questionable, those ideas, thoughts, practices, theories that prevail as untouchable and irreplaceable. It is not just a matter of decolonizing practices and knowledge –which is a powerful and necessary movement–, nor is it simply about replacing reference figures, or of placing ourselves reactively in an antagonistic position, which could lead to everything changing to stay the same.

In his book entitled *Lacan en México, México en Lacan: Miller y el mundo*, Manuel Hernández (2016) carries out a review of those official and public discourses, from which the future of psychoanalysis is analyzed from a critical position. This excerpt, which is quoted here in its extension and which summarizes the author’s work, is as follows:

Pero antes de la colonialidad siempre hay un movimiento de conquista colonial. Fue con lo que me topé hace más de veinte años en boca de Eric Laurent cuando dio un seminario en México y dijo que la Asociación Mundial de Psicoanálisis, fundada por Miller en 1992, se había propuesto conquistar todos los territorios donde la IPA había expulsado a Lacan. Jamás lo he olvidado. Hace algunos años Jacques-Alain Miller fue todavía más específico cuando hizo un nuevo llamado a los miembros de la EOL en Buenos Aires a que vinieran a México a instalarse y “abrir México a la orientación lacaniana”.

[But before coloniality there is always a movement of colonial conquest. It was what I came across more than twenty years ago in the mouth of Eric Laurent when he gave a seminar in Mexico and said that the World Association of Psychoanalysis, founded by Miller in 1992, had set out to conquer all the territories where the IPA had expelled Lacan. I have never forgotten it. A few years ago, Jacques-Alain Miller was even more specific when he made a new call to the members of the EOL in Buenos Aires to come to Mexico to settle and “open Mexico to the Lacanian orientation”]. (p. 15)

So, given the amount of productions that the EOL has generated, the theoretical contribution is undeniable, but it is our duty to face the fact that what is being carried out is only a massive diffusion of a new product that is trying to spread regardless of whether it is a contribution, a dilemma or if it responds to allied ambitions of estate capitalism where there is a “boss” who has bought everything and only wants to expand his territory of exploitation and domination.

It is not exclusively about Mexico, a specific situation that has been unfavorable for the local authors of that country, it is a real virus that tries to enter the very bowels of every attempt at literary and theoretical subjectivity, destroying the freedoms of reflection, criticism and progress.

The pending challenges are not only a point that must be considered when looking at the productions of the Slovenian school, it is rather a pending challenge for the productions of our century, we continue without a fair and dignified future for Latin American authors because, in each return, we return to the same authors and, in our time, our attention persists abroad. We are a theoretical periphery due to our own practices, which although influenced by cultural elements, by a sort of colonized imprint, is not a reason to justify and maintain the scenario unchanged.

Just as the Slovenian school has had to confront attacks that call into question the veracity and contributions of its discourse and productions, local authors, thinkers and writers repeat the same practice, but not on external enemies, but on those we have to consider our allies.

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